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Criminal Courts
Supreme Court of Canada
COPS TOP COURTS IN PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE
In a recent Angus Reid Global 
Monitor Poll, more Canadians had 
confidence in the police than the 
other elements of the criminal 
justice system.  And municipal police          
forces barely squeaked out the RCMP. 
Nationally, criminal courts ranked the lowest with 17% 
of those polled having complete or a lot of confidence 
in them. The Supreme Court of Canada was second 
lowest at 31%, beat out by the RCMP at 37% and 
municipal police at 38%. The Ontario and Quebec 
provincial police forces had 45% and 33% confidence 
ratings respectively.  
Canadians had greater confidence in the Supreme 
Court of Canada then they did in their criminal courts. 
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Complete Angus Reid report “Canadians Give Poor 
Reviews to Their Own Justice System” available at
www.angusreidstrategies.com/uploads/pages/pdfs/2008.07.15_JusticeII.pdf
Criminal Courts
The criminal courts had the lowest public confidence 
level with its internal operations and leadership. 
Atlantic Canadians had the highest confidence in their 
courts (at 22%) while Alberta, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan had the lowest (at 10%). British Columbia 
and Quebec were just below the national average (at 
16%) while Ontario was slightly higher at 20%.
Police
Police had the highest levels of public confidence across 
the country. However, public confidence levels differed 
across the regions. Municipal police and the RCMP had 
the highest confidence levels in Ontario (45% and 41% 
respectively). In British Columbia the RCMP had its 
lowest confidence rating at 29% while Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan had the lowest municipal confidence at 
19%. 
For WPFG info see pages 18-19
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“I just had the 
opportunity to read one 
of your most current 
newsletters. What a great reference 
tool to keep all officers abreast of the changing laws in 
our country.” - Police Inspector, Alberta
*********
“I have been reading your 10-8 newsletter 
and have found it to be great reading. 
Very informative!!” - Senior Police 
Constable, New Brunswick
*********
“I was hoping that you would be able to add 
my name to the electronic version of 10-8. 
I am a member of the Military Police...and 
the references made in the newsletter have been very 
valuable” - Military Police Officer, Ontario
*********
“Thank you for providing the 10-8 
publication. It assists greatly when 
reading case law. I find that I could use 
another perspective after trying to digest case law 
directly from the SCC, Ontario Court of Appeals, etc.” 
- Police Constable, Ontario  
*********
“Could you please add me to your 
electronic distribution list for the 10-8 
newsletter. It is always a good read, 
however, it can be hard to come by down at [police 
headquarters].” - Police Detective, British Columbia 
*********
“[O]ne of the most informative 
newsletter[s] in the policing world in 
Canada. This publication  ...  is chalk full of 
new Case Law and changes to the Criminal Code. ... The 
publication ... is very informative from Breath tests to 
Drug charges and everything in between. ... Patrol 
members will certainly enjoy this document.“ - Police 
Sergeant, New Brunswick
*********
“I really enjoy the 10-8 magazine. The 
information is invaluable and with out it I 
don’t know how we would keep up with all 
the changes to legislation.” - Police Sergeant, British 
Columbia 
www.10-8.ca
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 33 for the answers.
1. All occupants of a vehicle are presumptively detained 
when the vehicle is stopped for a traffic violation?
 (a) True
 (b) False
 
2. Asking a driver to blow into an officer’s face for the 
purpose of determining the source of an alcohol 
odour is a permissible screening technique and does 
not engage the right to counsel under s.10(b) of the  
Charter.
 (a) True
 (b) False
 
3. Which province had the most appeals before the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 2007?  
 (a) British Columbia; 
 (b) Alberta;
 (c) Ontario;
 (d) Quebec.
4. The informational duty imposed on the police under 
s.10(b) of the Charter is to give the detained person 
notice of their rights, not to tell them how to 
exercise them. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. A police officer need not make a s.254(2) Criminal 
Code approved screening device demand 
instantaneously upon discovering that the driver has 
alcohol in their body, but should do so promptly 
after the requisite suspicion is formed. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
6. Which of the following was the most frequent 
offence in adult criminal court in 2006/2007?
    (a) impaired driving; 
 (b) theft;
 (c) fraud;
 (d) breach of probation;
 (e) drug possession.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Authorization Review Standard
“The trial judge has to consider whether there 
is sufficient reliable information on the basis 
of which the authorizing judge could have 
granted the authorization. 
The authorizing judge must be satisfied that 
there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an 
offence has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and 
that the authorization sought will afford evidence of that 
offence. However, the trial judge does not stand in the shoes 
of the authorizing judge when conducting the review. The 
question for the trial judge is whether there was any basis on 
which the authorizing judge could have granted the 
authorization. 
The trial judge should only set aside an authorization if satisfied 
on all the material presented, and on considering ‘the totality 
of the circumstances’, that there was no basis on which the 
authorization could be sustained.  The trial judge’s function is 
to examine the supporting affidavit as a whole, and not to 
subject it to a ‘microscopic analysis.’” - British Columbia Court 
of Appeal Chief Justice Finch, R. v. Lee and Tao, 2008 BCCA 
240, at paras. 12-14, references omitted. 
SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 
(ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA) 
CONFERENCE
October 5-7, 2008
The Seventh North American Conference on Shaken 
Baby Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma is being held on 
October 5-7, 2008 in beautiful Vancouver, British 
Columbia. This year, over 100 specialized experts will 
be presenting from around the world, including a strong 
legal track. 
**BC Residents** Prevent Shaken Baby Syndrome BC 
has arranged a group rate reduction for all BC 
professionals and parents. The group rate for BC 
attendees is only $150 USD for the full three days of 
training.  When registering, under Group Code enter BC 
Group Rate to receive the discounted rate. 
For more information please visit 
www.dontshake.org/conference2008
www.10-8.ca
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CELL PHONE POSSESSION HELPS 
PROVE TRAFFICKING CHARGE
R. v. Jama, 2008 MBCA 73        
                                  
An undercover police officer called a 
telephone drug line to make a purchase 
of drugs. A vehicle with four occupants, 
including the accused seated in the rear 
passenger seat, arrived at the meeting location within 
six minutes of the call. The accused was not involved 
in handling the drug, the money or speaking to the 
police officer. When arrested he said he was just 
getting a ride home. He was however, in possession of 
a cellular phone with a telephone number different 
than the “drug line” number but which rang when 
police dialled the number that was used to arrange 
the drug deal. 
At trial the judge drew an inference that the accused 
had knowledge of and participated in the drug 
transaction. A police expert testified the usual 
practice with “dial-a-dealer” transactions was that all 
persons in the vehicle have knowledge of what is 
transpiring and that all people in the vehicle serve a 
purpose and perform a specific task.  Further, the 
expert said a dial-a-dealer would not forward a drug 
line to another phone. Even though it may have been 
possible, the expert had never encountered such a 
circumstance in his experience. And finally, the cell 
phone was in the right, front pant pocket of the 
accused and rang when the number used to initiate 
the drug transaction was dialled.  In convicting the 
accused of trafficking under s. 5(1) of the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act, the trial judge stated:
The only reasonable inference to be drawn is that 
this telephone, the cellular telephone, the one that 
was tested and rang when the police officer 
redialed the number that was used for the original 
drug purchase and determined it was the same 
phone that had been used.
There are no facts nor circumstances from which 
the court could draw a conclusion or an inference 
that the accused did not have knowledge of what 
was transpiring in that vehicle.   Further, that the 
telephone was somehow put into his pocket without 
his knowledge is also quite speculative.
The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge did not turn his mind to 
the possibility that the accused’s cell phone rang 
when the drug line number was dialled by the police 
because a third party had forwarded the drug line 
number to the accused’s telephone without his 
knowledge or participation.  Justice Steel, delivering 
the unanimous opinion of the Court, dismissed the 
appeal. In her view, the inferences drawn by the trial 
judge were reasonable and the evidence did not give 
rise to any rational inference consistent with 
innocence.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SUPREME COURT HEARINGS 
DOWN
In its Bulletin of Proceedings: 
Special Edition, “Statistics 
1997 to 2007”, the workload 
of the Supreme Court of 
Canada has been outlined. In 
2007, the Supreme Court 
heard 53 appeals. This is a 10 year low, 39% lower 
than the 10 year average, and 50% lower than 1998. 
Case Life Span 
The time it takes to render a judgment from the date 
of hearing is at a 10 year high. In 2007 it took 6.6 
months for the Court to render a decision. This is 
more than twice as long as it did in 1998 (2.8 months). 
Overall, it takes an average of 19.1 months for the 
Court to render an opinion from the time an 
application for leave to hear a case is filed. This time 
span is two months longer than it took in the 
preceding year (2006). 
Appeals Heard
Of the 53 cases heard in 2007, British Columbia had 
the highest number of any province at 13, followed by 
Quebec and Ontario each with 11. No appeals 
originated from the 
Northwest Territories, 
Nunavut, Prince Edward 
Island, Newfoundland, 
or the Yukon.
Of all the appeals heard 
in 2007, 54% were 
criminal while the 
remaining 46% were 
civil. Nine percent dealt 
with Charter criminal 
cases. 
www.10-8.ca
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Ten of the appeals heard in 2007 were as of right. 
This source of appeal includes cases where there is a 
dissent on a point of law in a provincial court of 
appeal. The remaining 43 cases had leave to appeal 
granted. This is where a three judge panel gives 
permission to the applicant for the appeal to be 
heard. 
Appeal Judgments
 
Like appeals heard, appeal judgments were also at a 
10 year low. In 2007 the high Court released 58 
judgments, 21 fewer than the year before and 49 
fewer than 1997. Two of the 58 decisions last year 
were delivered from the bench while 56 were 
delivered after being reserved. As well, 30 of the 
appeals were allowed while 28 were dismissed. And 
the court was more divided than previous years. In 
2007 only 62% of the judgments were unanimous. 
This is down from 80% unanimity in 2006. 
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/download/ecourt.pdf
SUPREME COURT FAST FACTS:
What does a Judge Make?
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is paid an 
annual salary of $334,100 while the remaining puisne 
judges (judges other than the Chief Justice)  make 
$309,300. 
When must a Judge Retire?
A Supreme Court justice holds office until they 
retire or turn 75 years old. They are however, 
removable for incapacity or misconduct by the 
Governor General on address of the Senate and 
House of Commons.
What to Call a Supreme Court Judge? 
Lawyers may use either "Justice", "Mr. Justice" or 
"Madam Justice," when addressing members of the 
Court during an appeal hearing. Counsel are asked to 
refrain from addressing the judges as "My Lord", "My 
Lady", "Your Lordship," or "Your Ladyship." In written 
correspondence, the Chief Justice is addressed as 
"The Right Honourable" and the other judges are 
addressed as "The Honourable Madam Justice" or as 
"The Honourable Mr. Justice".
How Many Judges on a Case?
A minimum number of five judges must hear an appeal. 
However, usually seven or nine judges hear a case. 
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca/faq/faq/index_e.asp#f11
2007
www.10-8.ca6
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FOUR MINUTE DELAY IN 
WALKING DRIVER TO ASD 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. Megahy, 2008 ABCA 207
 
A police officer working a checkstop 
operation stopped a vehicle driven by 
the accused. The officer noted “a slight 
odour of alcohol” when the driver’s 
window was rolled down and saw the accused had 
bloodshot eyes. The officer asked the accused 
whether he had been drinking. He said he had “three” 
and was then asked to produce his driver’s licence. He 
fumbled through his wallet to find his licence and the 
officer asked the accused to accompany him to the 
checkstop bus, which was located across a major 
roadway and 1½ blocks away. The men walked to the 
bus and, once inside, the officer made a roadside 
demand, which took place four minutes after the 
stop. The accused failed the roadside screening 
device (RSD) and a breathalyzer demand was made. 
The accused failed the breathalyzer test and was 
subsequently charged with impaired driving and over 
80mg%. 
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the investigating 
officer agreed he relied on the failed RSD test, in 
part, to form the opinion the accused was impaired 
and that he could easily have kept his RSD with him 
during the checkstop operation. The trial judge found 
the accused’s Charter rights had been violated and 
could not be saved by  s.1.  In her view, the police 
officer failed to make the roadside demand 
“forthwith” upon forming the requisite suspicion and 
did not have the screening device with him at the 
roadside. The delay in administering the roadside 
test amounted to a serious Charter breach and the 
failed test result was excluded from evidence under 
s.24(2). The grounds for the breathalyzer demand 
were therefore inadequate, the certificate of 
analysis excluded, and the accused was acquitted of 
both charges.
On appeal by Crown to the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench the trial judge’s decision was overturned. The 
appeal judge concluded the roadside demand need not 
be made immediately upon the officer forming the 
suspicion the driver has alcohol in their body, but only 
reasonably promptly in the circumstances. The four 
minute delay in this case was forthwith under 
s.254(2) of the Criminal Code, no Charter violation 
occurred, and there was no reason to resort to 
s.24(2). A new trial was ordered. 
A further appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal by 
the accused required the court to again consider 
whether the four minute delay in making the roadside 
demand did not satisfy the requirements of s.254(2) 
as the word “forthwith” is interpreted and therefore 
constituted a Charter violation. Section 254(2) 
authorizes an officer to make a roadside demand 
when they reasonably suspect that a person operating 
a motor vehicle or in care or control has alcohol in 
their body. The section requires the person to 
provide forthwith a breath sample to enable a proper 
analysis by means of an approved screening device 
and, where necessary, to accompany the peace 
officer for the purpose of enabling such a sample of 
breath to be taken.
Justice Martin, authoring the Court’s judgment 
respecting the “forthwith” issue, noted that the word 
“forthwith” is used only once in the section to require 
immediate compliance with the police officer’s 
demand for a breath sample. It addresses post 
demand delay—the delay between the demand and the 
time it took the driver to provide the sample in 
response to the demand. The section, however, is 
silent as to pre-demand delay—the  time permitted 
for the police officer to make the demand after 
forming the requisite suspicion. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has determined that a 
detention and the temporary suspension of a driver’s 
Charter rights (including the right to counsel) in the 
case of a roadside test will be saved by s.1 if the time 
is limited only as much as is reasonably possible. But 
a flexible approach and broad interpretation to the 
meaning of “forthwith” has been adopted and some 
leeway is permissible to allow a reliable test to be 
taken.
In assessing the delay it took for the police to make 
the demand in this case, the Court of Appeal ruled 
that the demand “should be made promptly, but not 
necessarily immediately” after forming the suspicion. 
Justice Martin continued:
Moreover, the approach suggested by the [accused] 
would require a police officer to make a s. 254(2) 
demand instantaneously upon discovering that the 
driver has alcohol in his or her body, for fear of 
losing critical seconds. With respect, that 
proposition is untenable.
www.10-8.ca
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ASD Time Sequence-a flexible approach
To illustrate, one may consider the following 
scenario. A driver is stopped at a police checkstop. 
The officer approaches and asks the driver if he or 
she has been drinking alcohol, and the 
driver replies in the affirmative. Using 
the [accused’s] strict approach, any 
further questions (even to determine 
the amount of alcohol actually consumed 
or the apparent state of the driver’s 
sobriety and ability to drive) would not 
be permitted, as the time taken to ask 
and answer the questions would put the 
demand a few seconds or minutes out of 
time. In other words, every driver 
suspected of having alcohol in his or her system, 
even those who had only one drink and would 
reasonably be considered fit to drive, would 
nonetheless have their constitutional rights 
suspended while subjected to a roadside demand 
and made to provide a breath sample or face a 
charge for refusing to do so. In short, rather than 
allowing the police officer to make reasonable, 
preliminary observations to determine whether a 
roadside demand is warranted or whether the 
driver is being truthful in claiming he or she had 
only one or two drinks, all drivers with any alcohol 
in their system would be tested without an 
opportunity to explain how much they had to drink 
or when. That would hardly be an efficient 
screening system.
Clearly, a police officer must be allowed the time 
reasonably necessary to decide whether it is 
appropriate to make a demand for a breath sample 
under s. 254(2). This may include questioning to 
determine whether the driver has alcohol in his or 
her system as a result of having taken wine at 
communion, or having spent a day at a bar. No 
laudable purpose is met by continuing to detain the 
former driver to require him or her to submit to a 
roadside screening test. [references omitted, 
paras. 16-18]
In this case, Justice Martin found the delay in making 
the s.254(2) demand was not reasonably necessary. 
He stated:
It will be recalled that the officer was specifically 
assigned to participate in the checkstop and knew he 
would require the roadside screening device, yet he 
kept it in the bus 1½ blocks away. The 
officer’s explanation for keeping the 
roadside screening device in the bus 
amounted to a matter of personal choice and 
convenience rather than inadvertence or 
necessity. Thus, for no good reason, the 
officer required the [accused] to walk 
approximately four minutes from the location 
of the checkstop to the checkstop bus, at 
which time the roadside demand was made. 
The pre-demand delay was relatively minor, 
but because it was unnecessary and unreasonable in the 
circumstances, it constitutes a violation of the 
[accused’s] Charter rights. [para. 20]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the trial judge’s 
ruling in excluding the evidence under s.24(2) was 
upheld, and the acquittal was restored.  
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
BY THE BOOK:
s.254(2) Criminal Code (***new July 2, 2008)
If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body and 
that the person has, within the preceding three hours, 
operated a motor vehicle or vessel, operated or 
assisted in the operation of an aircraft or railway 
equipment or had the care or control of a motor 
vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment, 
whether it was in motion or not, the peace officer may, by demand, 
require the person to comply with paragraph (a), in the case of a drug, 
or with either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b), in the case of alcohol: 
(a) to perform forthwith physical coordination tests prescribed by 
regulation to enable the peace officer to determine whether a 
demand may be made under subsection (3) or (3.1) and, if 
necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose; and
(b) to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in the peace officer’s 
opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be made by means of an 
approved screening device and, if necessary, to accompany the 
peace officer for that purpose.
ASD demand
Time of driving or 
care or control
Time of Test“forthwith”
Post demand delay: 
time the police took 
to administer the test.
Pre-demand delay:
time the police took to 
make the demand.
“promptly, but not 
necessarily immediately”
“[A] police officer must 
be allowed the time 
reasonably necessary to 
decide whether it is 
appropriate to make a 
demand for a breath 
sample under s.254(2).” 
www.10-8.ca8
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PERMISSIBLE SCREENING 
TECHNIQUE INCLUDES REQUEST 
TO BLOW IN OFFICER’S FACE
R. v. Weintz, 2008 BCCA 233
A motorist saw a pickup truck being 
driven in an erratic manner and called 
police. The vehicle was observed go over 
the middle line of the highway and then 
overcorrect and go almost to the edge of the road.  
The responding police officer followed the vehicle for 
a short distance, saw it  wander away from the centre 
line to the fog line and back again, and then pulled it 
over. As the officer spoke to the accused (driver) at 
the truck’s window, he could smell an odour of liquor 
coming from inside the vehicle. 
The officer asked the accused if he had been drinking 
anything. Before the accused could answer, a 
passenger took responsibility for any smell of 
liquor. The officer then asked the accused to get out 
of the vehicle and directed him to blow in his face. He 
complied and the officer detected an odour of alcohol 
on his breath. An approved screening device (ASD) 
demand was made and the accused failed the test. He 
was given his Charter rights and a breathalyzer 
demand.  The accused subsequently provided breath 
samples indicating a blood alcohol content of 120mg%. 
He was charged with impaired driving and with driving  
over 80mg%.  
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued that his Charter rights were 
infringed when the officer requested he blow breath 
into his face. The trial judge disagreed and the 
accused was convicted on the over 80mg% charge. 
The accused successfully appealed to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court. The appeal judge recognized 
that physical co-ordination tests, which would merely 
provide an opportunity for the police to observe the 
accused’s command of his faculties during a traffic 
stop, constituted a reasonable limit on the right to 
counsel under s.10(b), but in this case the accused was  
not asked to perform such tests. Instead, he was 
requested to blow into the officer's face which was 
conscripting a form of bodily sample. This breached 
the accused’s rights under s.8 (unreasonable search 
and seizure) and s.7 (life, liberty, and security of the 
person) of the Charter which could not be saved under 
s.1.  Further, the appeal judge ruled the evidence 
inadmissible under s.24(2) because its admission 
would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.  The accused’s appeal was allowed and he 
was acquitted of the over 80mg% charge.  
The Crown then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal submitting the request by the officer 
for the accused to blow in his face was a permissible 
infringement of the accused’s Charter rights. The 
accused, on the other hand, argued the request to 
blow was an investigative technique that was 
different from asking a driver about drinking or a 
request to perform physical tests at the roadside to 
assess sobriety. 
Justice Hall, writing the reasons for the Court, first 
noted that a police officer is permitted to stop a 
driver and perform screening tests aimed at 
determining whether the driver had alcohol in their 
body without advising them of their right to counsel 
under s.10(b) of the Charter.  “Any violation was found 
to be justified under s.1 of the Charter because the 
right accorded under s.10(b) was incompatible with 
the proper functioning of the important objective of 
detecting and deterring drunk drivers and the rights 
provided by s.10(b) were minimally infringed because 
the detention was brief,” said Justice Hall. 
Permissible screening tests that may be conducted 
prior to advising a driver about the right to counsel 
include asking them about alcohol consumption, 
physical sobriety tests, or roadside breath tests 
using an approved screening device.
Justice Hall concluded that the request to blow in the 
face of the officer was a permissible roadside 
screening technique. He stated:
In the present case, I … do not perceive any 
distinction between [investigative procedures such 
as a physical sobriety test or asking a driver 
questions about drinking] and asking a person to 
blow breath into the face of the investigating 
officer. All are simply different roadside screening 
methodologies utilized by a police officer to detect 
the presence of alcohol in the body of a driver. In 
the instant case, such a request was reasonable 
because of the factual circumstances of this case.  
When the officer here directed a question to the 
[accused] about drinking, there was an immediate 
response from the adult passenger that he had 
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been drinking and that any odour of alcohol in the 
vehicle was presumably attributable to the 
passenger. It then became requisite for the officer 
to determine the source of the odour of liquor. An 
effective and speedy methodology of doing such an 
assessment was to make the request the officer 
did to this [accused].  Such a procedure is, in my 
opinion, minimally intrusive and can be speedily 
performed at the side of the road.  [para. 22]
And the request to blow in the face of the officer was 
not akin to being conscripted to incriminate oneself 
such as a case where police take hair samples, teeth 
impressions or buccal swabs for DNA from an 
individual arrested and in police custody. “The results 
of roadside screening techniques or questions about 
alcohol consumption are not to be utilized as evidence 
to incriminate a driver,” said Justice Hall. Rather, 
evidence obtained as a result of roadside screening 
procedures without the right to counsel is used as an 
investigative tool to confirm or reject the officer's 
suspicion that the driver might be impaired.  The 
results of the roadside screening procedures are 
limited to determining whether there existed a 
proper basis to make a demand for a breathalyzer 
sample: 
  
[T]he request to blow breath was not for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence to incriminate the 
[accused]. The possibility of obtaining evidence that 
could incriminate the [accused] only arose at that 
point in time when the investigating officer 
concluded he had reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe that the individual had been driving whilst 
impaired or had consumed alcohol to an extent to 
have a blood alcohol reading over .08. At that point 
in time, of course, the required information must be 
furnished to a driver that he has the right to retain 
and instruct counsel without delay and the driver is 
to be afforded such right (Charter s. 10(b)). [para. 
25]
When the officer requested the accused to blow 
breath in his face he was not being asked to provide 
evidence that could be used to incriminate him, unlike 
the situation when a breathalyzer test is requested.  
The request is simply part of a roadside screening 
process, similar to sobriety tests or asking about 
alcohol consumption, where the information obtained 
is not available to incriminate the driver, but merely 
for the purposes of establishing the officer’s grounds 
for demanding a breathalyzer sample at which point 
they are entitled to the full protection of s.10(b).  
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the matter was 
remitted back to the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia to resolve the remaining issues yet to be 
decided in the original appeal from conviction.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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POLICE DUTY IS TO INFORM, 
NOT GIVE LEGAL ADVICE 
R. v. Willier, 2008 ABCA 126
 
The accused was identified as a suspect 
in the stabbing death of an adult female. 
He was located at his brother’s house at 
12:40 pm and arrested, but was not 
advised of his right to counsel. Thinking he might be 
in some medical distress, the police discussed his 
health, recent drug use, and about taking him to the 
hospital. He said, “Okay, you guys are done (U/I) I 
want a lawyer, I don’t want to be questioned.” He was 
then taken to the hospital, treated and advised of his 
right to counsel (about five hours after his arrest). 
He said he understood his rights but did not want to 
speak to a lawyer right then, he wanted to wait until 
the next day. He was released from the hospital at 
about midnight and taken to the police station. 
He was again read his rights, indicated he wanted to 
speak to a free lawyer, and legal aid was called. The 
call lasted approximately three minutes and he was 
returned to his cell. The next morning at 7:50 am the 
accused was taken from his cell. He asked to call a 
lawyer again. After some discussion, the accused’s 
lawyer of choice was called and a message was left on 
his answering machine. The accused initially declined 
to call another lawyer, but did speak to legal aid once 
again for one minute. About 50 minutes later the 
accused was re-cautioned, indicated he was satisfied 
with the legal advice he had obtained, and told he 
could talk to a lawyer again if he wished. His right to 
remain silent was repeated, but he nevertheless 
provided a lengthy statement. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
judge found the accused’s statement was voluntarily 
given. The officer was courteous throughout the 
interview, there were no inappropriate inducements 
offered, and the accused was very engaged, alert, 
focused, and rational. The judge did, however, 
conclude that there were two breaches of the 
accused’s Charter rights. 
1) When the accused was arrested at his brother’s 
apartment, he was not advised of his right to 
counsel. He described the police conduct in 
obtaining medical treatment for the accused as “a 
very commendable course of action”, but was 
nonetheless satisfied he should have been advised 
of his right to counsel at this time and provided 
an opportunity to exercise it since his medical 
condition was not as serious as police assumed.
2) The following morning the accused was denied his 
right to a reasonable opportunity to consult 
counsel of his choice before the interview 
commenced. He found the police “actively 
discouraged” the accused from waiting for a 
return call back from his lawyer of choice and 
“immediately directed him to Legal Aid”. Instead 
of proceeding with the interview, the officer 
should have waited to see if the accused’s lawyer 
of choice called back, make another call to his 
office an hour or two later, or even wait until the 
next day when his office was open.
In the trial judge’s view two calls to Legal Aid totaling 
only four minutes were insufficient to allow for a 
“meaningful” opportunity to instruct and retain 
counsel. And the accused had not waived his right to 
a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of his 
choice. He was unaware that the police had a duty to 
cease questioning him until he had a reasonable 
opportunity to consult counsel of his choice and could 
not waive a right he did not know he had. The 
admission of the statement would affect the fairness 
of the trial and it was ruled inadmissible. The accused 
was acquitted of murder. 
The Crown then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal which had to decide whether the accused’s 
s.10(b) rights were breached or waived by him and 
whether the evidence should have been excluded 
under s.24(2).
s.10(b) Duties 
Justice Slatter, authoring the majority judgment, 
first examined the three duties imposed upon the 
police under s.10(b) of the Charter when they arrest 
or detain a person:
1) to inform the detainee of their right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay and of the 
existence and availability of Legal Aid and duty 
counsel; and
2) if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise 
this right, to provide them with a reasonable 
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opportunity to exercise the right (except in 
urgent and dangerous circumstances), and
3) to refrain from eliciting evidence from the 
detainee until they have had that reasonable 
opportunity (again, except in cases of urgency or 
danger).
Informational Duty
The majority described the informational duty this 
way:
The informational duty of the police is to give 
“information” or “notice” to the accused of his right 
to counsel. There is no duty on the police to give the 
detained person legal advice, including advice on how 
he should exercise his right to counsel. Indeed, 
were the police to give legal advice to the detained 
person, that might confuse or even mislead the 
detained person about his rights. When the 
detained person wishes to speak to “counsel of 
choice”, and in the short term can only access a 
Legal Aid lawyer, any advice about how to exercise 
the right to speak to counsel of choice should come 
from the Legal Aid lawyer, not from the police… 
[para. 36]
And further:
…the informational duty of the police is to give the 
detained person notice of his rights, not to tell him 
how to exercise those rights. The police are not 
there to give the detained person legal advice. … 
[para. 40]
The duty to hold off and provide a reasonable 
opportunity is not an informational duty, it is primarily 
an implementational one and there is no general rule 
requiring the police to inform the detainee that they 
are doing so. 
Here, the police had discharged their informational 
duty. The accused was told he had the right to counsel 
and that he could contact any lawyer 
he wanted and could immediately 
access a legal aid lawyer without 
charge. This was not a situation 
where a detainee initially asserted 
their right to counsel and was duly 
diligent in exercising it (having been 
afforded a reasonable opportunity) 
but had a change of mind and no 
longer wanted to consult counsel. If 
this was the case, the police had an 
additional informational obligation known as a 
"Prosper warning". The Prosper warning requires 
police tell the detainee of their right to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact a lawyer and the obligation of 
the police not to take any statements or require the 
detainee to participate in any potentially incriminating 
process until the detainee has had that reasonable 
opportunity. However, the rationale of Prosper does 
not apply to a “counsel of choice” situation where the 
detained person has spoken to duty counsel, as duty 
counsel should explain to the detained person the 
rights they have, obviating the need for the 
“additional informational obligation” on the police. 
Here, the accused had access to duty counsel and did 
not change his mind before consulting counsel, so the 
additional informational obligation did not apply. 
Implementational Duties 
The implementational duties are only triggered if a 
detainee indicates a desire to contact counsel. 
“Determining what is a reasonable opportunity to 
contact counsel depends on the factual context,” said 
Justice Slatter. The detainee must then be diligent in 
exercising their right to counsel and may waive their 
rights and make a statement. 
In this case the police arranged contact with Legal 
Aid, reminded the accused that he had a right to 
contact counsel of choice, and assisted him in 
telephoning his lawyer. The lawyer’s office was closed, 
but there was nothing the police or accused could do 
about that. Proceeding with the interview only 50 
minutes after a message was left on the lawyer’s 
answering machine did not breach the 
implementational duties. A reasonable opportunity to 
contact counsel depends on the factual context of the 
case. Here, it was a Sunday, unlikely that any lawyer’s 
office would be open that day, and there was no 
evidence that the lawyer’s answering machine was 
even checked on the weekends. The investigation was 
not urgent, in the sense that it 
did not depend on evidence that 
might disappear or deteriorate 
in the short term. The accused 
had spoken to Legal Aid twice, 
said he was satisfied with the 
advice he had received, and 
expressed a clear understanding 
of his right to remain silent.
“The informational duty of the 
police is to give “information” or 
“notice” to the accused of his right 
to counsel. There is no duty on 
the police to give the detained 
person legal advice, including 
advice on how he should exercise 
his right to counsel.”
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After being re-cautioned on the right to silence and 
the right to counsel 50 minutes later, the accused 
made no further request to speak to counsel before 
being interviewed. He knew he had not spoken to his 
lawyer and that he had a call outstanding to him. 
Absent a further request to speak to counsel the 
police were entitled to assume the accused was 
content with his inquiries.  “When the detained person 
makes a statement without asking for further legal 
advice the police are not required to guess that he 
needs more time, or what is going on in his mind,” said 
Justice Slatter. 
Quality of the Legal Advice Received
The accused argued that the quality of the legal 
advice he received breached his Charter right to 
“counsel of choice” because it was inadequate. He 
suggested that his counsel of choice would have been 
more diligent and given him better advice. Thus, he 
was prejudiced by the inadequacy of advice he 
received and it was impossible for him to get 
appropriate advice during the short calls (three 
minutes and one minute) with the Legal Aid lawyer. In 
rejecting this argument, Justice Slatter stated:
There is however no way that the police could know 
that. The telephone calls are privileged, and the 
police are not entitled to listen in 
on them, or to ask the detained 
person what advice was given. 
Even if the detained person 
blurted out the advice, it would be 
inappropriate for the police to 
second-guess that advice, as that 
undermines the relationship 
between the detained person and 
counsel. 
Even if the advice was inadequate, 
that is not something for which 
the police are responsible. The 
legal system cannot tolerate a 
disincentive for an accused to 
consult competent counsel, or an incentive for 
competent counsel to give incompetent advice. The 
police are required to notify the detained person 
that he has a right to counsel, not to audit that 
advice once given. The police should not be expected 
to stand by the interview room with a stopwatch, 
and insist that the detained person and counsel stay 
on the line for some minimum amount of time. For 
one thing, it is impossible to know what that minimum 
amount of time might be. Secondly, even if the 
conversation was lengthy, there is no assurance (and 
no way the police would know) that the advice given 
was appropriate, not just verbose. [paras. 27-28]
And later:
…We are unable to agree with the suggestion that 
the police have a duty, or the ability, to monitor the 
quality of the advice received by the detained 
person in any particular case… 
.........
The responsibility of the police was to inform the 
respondent that he had the right to counsel, and to 
give him the means to exercise that right. Any 
breach of his rights must arise out of those 
responsibilities. Whatever other remedies might 
accrue to the respondent, the quality of the advice, 
or lack thereof, is not per se a basis for the 
exclusion of a statement under s. 10(b) of the 
Charter. The trial judge’s conclusion that there was 
a Charter breach, based partly on the inferred 
inadequacy of the legal advice the respondent 
received from Legal Aid, was an error of law. [para. 
29-31]
In this case, the accused did not testify, nor did his 
lawyer of choice or the Legal Aid lawyer. Nor did 
calling a well-known criminal defence lawyer, as an 
expert witness, outlining the type of advice he would 
give a detained person charged with murder and 
explaining it would be impossible to give appropriate 
advice in less than five minutes 
assist. Speculation about the nature 
of the advice that might have been 
given was not appropriate. As for 
whether the police should have 
waited an hour or two to see if the 
accused’s lawyer could be contacted, 
there was no evidence the lawyer 
ever called back and therefore no 
basis to conclude that only waiting 
50 minutes before commencing the 
interview had any effect at all. And 
there was no evidence that the 
lawyer’s home telephone number was publicly 
available. The accused bore the burden of proving a 
Charter breach and failed to do so. He could have 
testified on the voir dire or called his lawyer or Legal 
Aid, but did not.  
Waiver
After re-cautioning him on the right to silence and 
the right to counsel, the police commenced the 
“The police are required to notify 
the detained person that he has 
a right to counsel, not to audit 
that advice once given. The 
police should not be expected to 
stand by the interview room with 
a stopwatch, and insist that the 
detained person and counsel 
stay on the line for some 
minimum amount of time.”
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interview and the accused made a statement without 
requesting a further opportunity to speak to counsel. 
Waiver is not a purely subjective exercise, but can 
arise by conduct where a person with an operating 
mind does something that an objective observer would 
reasonably assume that the person was 
waiving the right. However, there is no 
duty on the state to protect a detained 
person beyond advising them of their 
rights and providing access to counsel. 
Proving waiver rests on the Crown. And 
waiver by conduct (speaking to the police) 
can be effective. A detainee can choose to 
waive the right to speak to counsel or to 
counsel of choice.
A detainee can also choose to waive their right to 
silence. “Within limits, the police can attempt to 
persuade the detained person to waive his rights and 
make a statement, even if he initially expresses an 
intention not to do so,” noted Justice Slatter. “The 
law is clear that the police are entitled to continue 
questioning a detained person even after that person 
has been advised (and expressed an intention) to 
remain silent.”
Here the trial judge erred in law by applying the test 
for waiver subjectively. The accused had an operating 
mind and knew his rights. He was told of his right to 
silence, his right to counsel, and his right to counsel 
of choice. The police discharged their informational 
duty. The accused spoke to Legal Aid on two occasions 
and said he was satisfied with the advice. The police 
were therefore entitled to attempt to obtain a 
statement from him absent any further request to 
speak to counsel of choice. The Crown discharged its 
burden in showing waiver, and the police were entitled 
to proceed with their investigation. There was no 
breach of the implementational duties of the police. 
And even if the accused’s rights were breached, the 
majority would have admitted the evidence under 
s.24(2) anyway. 
A Different View
Justice Bielby found the police should have waited 
longer for the accused’s lawyer of choice to call back. 
She stated:
I conclude that the failure of the police to wait for 
a reasonable period of time to allow [the accused’s 
lawyer of choice] to return [his] call after the 
commencement of business hours on the following 
Monday morning amounted to a s. 10(b) breach given 
that … the charge facing [the accused] was 
extremely serious and there was no particular 
urgency created by the need to preserve evidence 
or otherwise in the investigation. The learned trial 
judge did not err in law in 
determining that the two 
telephone calls to duty counsel 
did not provide [the accused] 
with a reasonable opportunity to 
exercise his right to meaningful 
contact with and the receipt of 
satisfactory advice from a 
lawyer. Having expressed a wish 
to speak to his own choice of 
lawyer prior to being interviewed, [the accused] was 
entitled to do so if it was possible within a 
reasonable period of time. He was entitled to wait 
until [his lawyer] returned his call or to once again 
attempt to reach [his lawyer] during normal business 
hours before being interviewed by the police. Taking 
into account the factual context in this case, [the 
accused’s] s.10(b) rights were infringed as a result 
of being interviewed in these circumstances. [para. 
77]
As for waiver, Justice Bielby found the accused had 
not waived his right to counsel because he did not 
know what his rights were. Before being interviewed, 
he was not told he had the right to wait a reasonable 
period of time for his own lawyer to return his call.  
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Detention
“The concept of detention has evolved 
since the Charter came into force and it is 
not always easy to determine in given 
circumstances whether and when it legally 
occurs. From the mere investigation to 
which a person wilfully collaborates to the custodial arrest of 
that person, there is a wide spectrum encompassing the 
varying degrees of legal jeopardies in which the state can 
put individuals; in some cases, the precise moment when 
detention arises is by no means easy to ascertain.” - 
Supreme Court of Canada Justice Gonthier, R. v. Schmautz, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 398 at p. 415.
“The law is clear that the 
police are entitled to continue 
questioning a detained person 
even after that person has 
been advised (and expressed 
an intention) to remain silent.”
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OBSERVING ICONS WITHOUT 
VIEWING CHILD PORN PROVIDED 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
R. v. Morelli, 2008 SKCA 62
A computer technician attended the 
accused’s residence, where he lived with 
his wife and two children, to install a 
high-speed Internet connection for a 
home computer. In the spare bedroom where the 
computer was located, the technician saw a web-cam 
on a tripod which was plugged into a VCR. The web-cam 
was pointed toward the accused’s three year old 
daughter who was playing with some toys on the floor. 
On the computer screen the technician observed two 
icons on the computer desktop, one entitled "Lolita 
Porn" and one entitled "Lolita XXX".
Because the technician could not complete the high-
speed Internet connection that day, he  returned the 
following day and found the children's toys were put 
away, the web-cam was turned toward the computer 
chair, and the computer hard drive had been 
formatted and all web site links were removed from 
the desktop. About two months later the technician 
reported what he saw. The investigating police officer 
obtained more information from two other officers 
familiar with computers and who were specialists in 
child pornography. 
The investigator was able to  confirm that "Lolita" was 
an underage Internet porn site that primarily dealt 
with children 14 years old and under. He also learned 
that child porn offenders are habitual, will continue 
their computer practices with child pornography, 
treasure collections on their computer, and like to 
store them and backup data in case it is lost. As well, 
he learned that information will remain inside the 
computer’s hard drive  and can be 
stored on media devices such as 
compact disks and floppy disks. 
The investigator then obtained a 
search warrant about two months 
after the report was made to 
search the accused’s residence 
for the computer and seize 
evidence of an offence under 
s.163.1(4) of the Criminal Code 
(possession of obscene material 
— child pornography). 
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, 
the accused challenged the validity of the search 
warrant and argued the Information did not provide 
reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant. 
He submitted, among other grounds, that the 
presence of a child pornography icon on his computer 
was insufficient for the officer to believe that child 
pornography images were stored in the computer. The 
trial judge disagreed and concluded this was 
sufficient to satisfy the authorizing justice that child 
pornography images existed in the computer. The 
accused was convicted of possessing child 
pornography and he was given an 18 month conditional 
sentence order.
The accused then appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the presence of 
the icons that were removed the following day, 
without actual images of child pornography, raised 
only a mere suspicion child pornography may exist but 
did not provide reasonable grounds to support the 
allegation of possession of child pornography. The 
Crown, on the other hand, countered that when 
reading the Information as a whole the statutory 
requirements of s.487 of the Criminal Code had been 
met. 
The Search Warrant 
The warrant in this case was issued under s.487. In 
describing the purpose of a warrant and its 
requirements, Justice Hunter, writing the majority 
opinion, stated:
The search warrant is the investigative tool which 
opens the premises of a person with possession of 
the article(s). A high degree of precision is expected 
in the documents supporting a request to issue a 
search warrant. Both the documents in support of 
the search warrant and the search warrant itself 
must contain a description of goods to be 
searched for by the executing officer and 
the issuing justice must be satisfied that 
the goods described, if found, will afford 
evidence of the commission of an offence. 
The basis of suspicion must be set out in 
the information which should demonstrate 
the nexus between the goods to be seized, 
the place where they are located and the 
offence. 
A justice of the peace may issue a warrant 
to search and seize item(s) where the 
“The search warrant is the 
investigative tool which opens 
the premises of a person with 
possession of the article(s). A 
high degree of precision is 
expected in the documents 
supporting a request to issue 
a search warrant.”
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conditions prescribed in s. 487 are met and the 
justice is satisfied there are reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the item(s) is in a 
building, receptacle or place. … [paras. 17-18] 
The test for reasonable grounds is one of reasonable 
probability based on the totality of the 
circumstances, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
or even a prima facie case. And in reviewing a search 
warrant, a trial judge is not to substitute their view 
for that of the authorizing judge. Rather, the test is 
whether the authorizing judge could have granted the 
warrant. 
In this case the technician did not see any actual 
images of child pornography on the accused’s 
computer. And when he returned the next day, the 
computer had been reformatted and the icons were no 
longer present on the desktop. However, the majority 
found the presence of a child pornography site icon on 
the accused’s computer desktop was sufficient to 
infer constructive possession of child pornography in 
order to obtain a search warrant. 
Criminal Code possession under s.4(3) can be personal, 
constructive, or joint. Unlike actual possession which 
requires physical control, constructive possession 
does not. Instead, control in constructive possession 
“arises from the person having or putting the thing at 
a place for his use or for the use of another person.”
For the purpose of obtaining a search warrant, 
Justice Hunter found that it was not necessary to 
establish the accused actually viewed child 
pornography. He said:
In viewing images on a computer, a person has 
control in that he may dwell on, pass over, go back to 
an image, and decide whether or not to save the 
images. It is similar to a person 
choosing to look at a book at the 
library and then choosing to put it 
back rather than making a copy or 
signing the book out. In all cases, the 
person has control. Therefore, 
whether the person views images on 
the Internet rather than a disk or 
other memory device, the result is 
the same. The person is in control and 
calls up images on the screen for 
personal use. The user has control 
over whether to display the images 
and to save, print or otherwise deal 
with the images. Therefore, it may be 
inferred the [accused] viewed the images based on 
the presence of the icons "Lolita Porn" and "Lolita 
XXX" in the favourites on his computer, i.e., 
constructive possession; and from which one could 
reasonably conclude, based on the contents of paras. 
3, 12, 13 and 16 of the Information, that the 
computer would afford evidence of the crime of 
possession of child pornography. [para. 40]
And further:
… To obtain a search warrant there must be some 
basis for the authorizing justice to be satisfied on 
the element of possession. In the instant case, since 
no one observed actual child pornography images on 
the [accused’s] computer, did the Information and 
evidence amplifying the statements in the 
Information indicate sufficient control by the 
[accused] to infer that he was in possession of child 
pornography so as to permit issuance of the search 
warrant?
The Information states [the technician] observed 
the icons on the desktop and the web-cam hooked up 
to a VCR pointing to the floor where the children's 
toys were located, raised a concern for [the 
technician]. All this was changed the next day. 
During the voir dire, [the technician] testified that 
part of his job was to service computer servers at 
schools to create software so that children could be 
prohibited from accessing pornographic websites. 
To do so he would personally check websites to 
check for pornographic content. He was aware the 
icons "Lolita Porn" and "Lolita XXX" were terms for 
child pornography. [He] testified that the computer 
user had to purposefully add the icons to a computer 
desktop. [Two other police specialists in the field of 
child pornography] provided [the investigating 
officer] with information about the storage of 
images on a computer and the habits of persons 
interested in child pornography which were 
adequate to form the basis of 
reasonable grounds to infer that 
such images would be stored in the 
computer and related equipment. 
From this it is reasonable to infer 
the [accused] had control 
sufficient to satisfy the criteria 
of constructive possession, within 
the meaning of s. 4(3) of the 
Criminal Code, to sustain the 
issuance of search warrant.
Therefore, on the basis of the 
whole of the evidence stated in the 
Information, as amplified by the 
“[O]bserving the icons only, 
without viewing child 
pornography, was sufficient to 
conclude there were reasonable 
and probable grounds to 
conclude the [accused] was in 
possession of child pornography 
and a reasonable probability the 
seizure of the computer would 
afford evidence with respect to 
the commission of an offence.” 
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testimony at the voir dire, there is no basis to 
interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that 
observing the icons only, without viewing child 
pornography, was sufficient to conclude there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to conclude the 
[accused] was in possession of child pornography and 
a reasonable probability the seizure of the 
computer would afford evidence with respect to the 
commission of an offence. [paras. 45-47]
The warrant was valid and the accused’s conviction 
appeal was dismissed.
A Dissenting Opinion
Justice Richards disagreed with the majority. In 
order for a warrant to be lawfully issued, the justice  
must be satisfied the facts established reasonable 
grounds for believing the accused’s computer, at the 
time the warrant was issued, contained images of child 
pornography. In his view, the totality of the 
circumstances, at most, raised a suspicion the accused 
might be in possession of child pornography but could 
not support a reasonable belief that his computer 
contained such material. As a result, the accused’s 
rights under s.8 of the Charter were breached and 
Justice Richards would have excluded the evidence 
under s.24(2) and quashed the conviction.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ROADSIDE DOG SNIFF 
UNLAWFUL FOR LACK OF 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
R. v. Slater & Paul, 2008 ABPC 139
A police officer pulled the accused’s 
vehicle over on the Trans Canada 
Highway at 3:30 am for weaving in its 
lane and wanted to see if the driver was 
impaired. But the driver was sober. However, the 
officer noticed the truck had a fuel tank in its open 
back and that there were irregularities with respect 
to it. After asking questions of both the driver and 
passenger about the length of their trip, and receiving 
different responses, he suspected that they were 
transporting drugs. He removed both accuseds from 
the truck and then brought out a drug dog that always 
accompanied him on highway patrols.  After the dog 
reacted to the fuel tank, the officer arrested both 
accuseds. He then opened up the fuel tank and found 
marijuana.  The vehicle was towed to the police station 
and a warrantless search of the tank revealed 129 
bags, each containing one pound of marijuana. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the judge found 
the accuseds rights had been breached. 
Improper Questioning
The judge found the question asked of the driver 
about the length of the trip was valid since the 
officer was concerned that the length of the drive 
might have left the accused Paul too tired to drive 
properly. However, when he asked the passenger 
Slater about the length of the trip the question was 
not related to driving and the nature of the 
investigation changed. This began the start of an 
investigation into possible drug trafficking which 
could not be justified under s.1 in the absence of s.10 
Charter rights being given. Judge Barley stated: 
An extension of the purpose of the question puts 
the detention in another realm, one that is covered 
by the Charter. The accused Slater was standing by 
the side of the road in the middle of the night, 
because he had been ordered to by the officer. It 
was unrealistic to say that he could leave, because 
the vehicle in which he had arrived was not in a 
position to go anywhere. Although he did not testify 
as to any feeling of psychological restraint, the fact 
of being pulled over and being told to stand away 
from the vehicle in the middle of the night in the 
middle of a largely unpopulated area, is clearly a 
detention. The accused should have been told of his 
right to counsel, and of the new reason for 
detention before he was asked to incriminate 
himself by answering a question of great 
significance to a drug investigation, though of no 
significance to a traffic stop. [para. 22]
He ruled the answer provided by the accused Slater 
resulted directly from a s.10(b) violation, was 
conscriptive evidence, and was inadmissible under 
s.24(2).
The Dog Sniff
A dog sniff for drugs constitutes a search and is only 
permissible when the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that evidence of an offence would be 
discovered. A significant part of the officer’s grounds 
for suspicion was the difference in the answers of the 
accuseds as to how long they had been away. But since 
the accused Slater’s response was inadmissible, the 
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judge had to determine whether there were 
sufficient grounds remaining to justify the dog sniff 
of the tank. In finding the irregularities noted by the 
officer respecting the fuel tank did not objectively 
support a reasonable suspicion that an offence 
involving drugs was being committed, Judge Barley 
stated:
The tank was clearly not industry standard, being 
too large, improperly painted, with an improper 
relief valve, with an inaccurate placard, and 
improper fastening. These are all concerns under a 
Dangerous Goods investigation. 
However, none of them point to the tank being used 
to transport something other than fuel. There was 
no evidence that this tank could not have been used 
to carry fuel. The fact that regulations might be 
violated show a lack of attention to detail. 
These errors do not seem to be anymore likely to be 
made when the intention is to put drugs in the tank, 
and not fuel. [paras. 28-30] 
The dog sniff was an unreasonable search under s.8 
and without the results of the dog’s reaction there 
were insufficient grounds to further detain the 
accused or to arrest them. And “without grounds for 
further detention or arrest, the officer did not have 
grounds to search the fuel tank, either by the 
roadside or at the detachment,” said Judge Barley. 
“These searches are in turn a violation of Section 8 of 
the Charter, as a warrantless search that is not saved 
by the authority to search incidental to arrest.”  The 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2). 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
CANADIAN ADULT CRIMINAL 
COURT STATISTICS RELEASED
Statistics Canada recently released its 
report entitled “Adult Criminal Court 
Statistics, 2006/2007” Highlights 
include:
• In 2006/2007 there were 372,084 cases involving 
1,079,062 charges;
• In cases where gender was recorded, 78% were 
male, 16% female, 6% no gender was recorded, and 
less than 1% involved a company;
• Nationally, the conviction rate (found guilty 
decisions) was 65%, while 30% of the cases were 
stayed or withdrawn and only 4% involved 
acquittals. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Adult Criminal Court Statistics, 
2006/2007, Catalogue no. 85-002-X available at www.statcan.ca
Top 10 Most Frequent Offences in Adult Criminal 
Court 2006/2007
Offence % of total cases
Impaired Driving 11.2%
Common Assault 10.9%
Theft 10.1%
Fail to Comply with Order 7.3%
Breach of Probation 7.2%
Major Assault 5.1%
Uttering Threats 4.4%
Fraud 4.1%
Drug Possession 3.8%
Possess Stolen Property 3.6%
F o u n d  G u i l ty  D e c i s io n s  2 0 0 6 / 2 0 0 7
6 9 %
8 0 %
6 5 %
6 2 %
7 3 %
7 7 %
6 3 %
6 7 %
7 4 %
7 0 %
5 9 %
6 5 %
7 1 %
5 0 %
5 5 %
6 0 %
6 5 %
7 0 %
7 5 %
8 0 %
8 5 %
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TRAINING DILEMMAS: 
QUESTIONS & POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS
Insp Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy 
In combat sports men do not fight 
against women. There are weight 
classes in gender specific combat 
sports. There are rules, referees, 
and timed rounds. Fighters train 
to fight and are attacked 
spontaneously.  
In fact, the Athletic Commissions in Mixed Martial 
Arts are currently reviewing the weight classes as 
there is a belief that there needs to be closer weight 
classes due to the advantages of being a larger 
opponent.  In some weight classes we are only talking 
a 15 pound difference. In policing however, we can 
often have a hundred pound difference! 
Are law enforcement officers trained to defeat a 
much larger, stronger, and more experienced fighter 
who spontaneously attacks them? 
Learning Environment Dilemma
Can a law enforcement officer learn a technique if 
they are learning the basics under duress? For 
example, when learning an escape from mount 
manoeuvre with a 205 pound male recruit in a mount 
position on a 140 pound female recruit is any learning 
going to realistically happen?  
Possible Solution: Ensure that the learning 
environment is conducive to learning.  The basics of 
the techniques must be taught in a learning 
environment that allows learning to be done!  Once 
basics are learned, they must be introduced to reality 
training!
Training Dilemma #1
Law enforcement officers are spontaneously 
assaulted most of the time.  Are you trained and ready 
for this?
Possible Solution: When running drills or doing 
training, the subject should (the majority of the time) 
come at the officer, not visa versa.  For example, in 
baton drills the training should centre around the 
officer and subject standing at interview distance. 
The subject should then approach the officer. The 
officer should then move off the line of attack, deploy 
their baton, and strike the bag. Or the officer may 
have the baton already drawn and strike the attacking 
subject. This greatly reduces the chance of a larger 
opponent getting their hands on a smaller officer.
Training Dilemma #2
Does your training fly in the face of reality? For 
example, are trainees standing still on the range, 
extending arms, closing an eye, slowly pulling the 
trigger and utilizing breath control and/or flinching 
into an attack versus reality, which is flinching away 
from an attack.
Possible Solution: Once you have trained or are 
trained, see if what was preached truly works.  
Reflect what the statistics report and  provide a 
deadly force assault within the 5 foot range where 
most deadly attacks occur. Then see if the firearms 
training applies. Or  lurch at a student in the hallway 
when he is not expecting it and see if he flinches 
inwards or outwards no matter how he was trained.
Physical Training Dilemma
Most law enforcement officers train in the gym as if 
they were bodybuilding, which has little to do with 
how a fighter trains, who I might add generally looks 
just as good. Slow deliberate movements with a weight 
or isolation exercises are not conducive to preparing 
you to win a confrontation.  Transferring the strength 
exercises from one body part to another, like we 
MUST do in a confrontation, is far better.
Possible Solution:  Utilize exercises such as the clean 
and jerk, dead lift, snatch, squat and bench press for 
strength.  Ensure plyometrics are incorporated into 
your work-out. Develop power by moving weight 
through a range of motions quickly. Concentrate on 
rotational power through your core and go hard in the 
gym with little rest time between sets.  
Instructor Techniques Dilemma
Are the techniques being taught what is actually best 
for the officer or best for the instructor?  If your 
instructor is a male and generally stronger than the 
opponent are the techniques being taught reflective 
of this, or will they work for a smaller officer?
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Possible Solution:  Ensure that what you are learning 
or teaching is the most suitable technique for the 
trainees size and strength and their own abilities.  
Just as instructors have different abilities, we should 
not try to create internal conflict in a student with 
what comes natural to them. If we have someone that 
is already a good kicker at the “striking range” this is 
what that person’s techniques should be based around. 
Each law enforcement officer should understand 
where their  strengths are and how to utilize those 
strengths. Be it re-action time, agility, lateral 
movement or strength.
What Tool At What Range Dilemma
It is generally easy for law enforcement officers to 
understand that if a subject is assaultive, and all 
things being equal, O.C. Spray may be an appropriate 
weapon to use. However, if statistics reveal that we 
are generally assaulted spontaneously and most 
assaults are with a subject’s body parts (hands/feet, 
etc.), each officer must understand that getting to 
their O.C. Spray while under physical attack and being 
hit is generally not the best action. They must make 
space to get to their O.C. spray generally from a close 
quarter confrontation range. This means using close 
quarter weapons to get this space. 
 
Possible Solution: The four fighting ranges - 
posturing, striking, close quarters and ground control 
- generally require different weapons. Each officer 
should fully understand what weapons apply at each 
distance with an assaultive or potentially assaultive 
person. 
• Posturing – the officer should be ready to use an 
appropriate weapon;
• Striking – this is hand and feet striking range;
• Close quarter – this is elbows and knees; 
• Ground control – understand how to defend 
against going to the ground. And if you are on the 
ground, understand limitations and how to escape 
and get to your feet.
To Hit or Not To Hit Dilemma  
If law enforcement officers are trained in control 
tactics and only hit bags, we all know that they are not 
any better trained than the hockey player that is only 
trained to skate and then thrown into a hockey game 
with no other skills.  However, if there are injuries in 
control tactics training there are complaints. And if 
there is force on force that is not done properly, 
there can be major training scars created!
Possible Solution:  Force on force must be used.  
However, it must be introduced gradually so that the 
students are prepared for it.  Stress inoculation is not 
just a catchy phrase.  It is effective and can be used 
to prepare officers for the reality of getting 
attacked on the street.   
Conclusion
There is no such thing as “one size fits all” training.  
Different people should have different tools in their 
toolbox.  If it is not realistic in the real world for a 
small officer escorting a 230 pound male subject to do 
an arm bar take-down. Training should not reflect this.  
Most times this is NOT the option that we want a 
small officer to do. Let’s be honest, this won't work 
most times if the male subject is a mean, pain tolerant 
individual. One last thing that cannot be overlooked in 
training is understanding pre-assaultive cues which 
can allow us to be ready to win before we are into the 
confrontation!  
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement. He presently teaches 
Physical Training, Use of Force and Tactical Firearms 
to Corrections, Law and Security, Conservation 
Officers and Police Cadets at the Atlantic Police 
Academy. Kelly is a second degree black belt in Jiu-
Jitsu and a Certified Personal Trainer, Strength and 
Conditioning Instructor, and a Certified Sports 
Nutrition Specialist. He can be reached by email at 
KKeith@pei.sympatico.ca 
British Columbia 
Police and Peace Officers 
Memorial Service
Sunday, 
September 28, 2008
1 pm
Peace Arch Park, 
British Columbia
More info at 
www.memorialribbon.com
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ROADSIDE VEHICLE SNIFF 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. Bramley & Schiller, 2008 SKPC 82
Two police officers pulled over a vehicle 
along the Trans Canada Highway. The 
accuseds vehicle drove by at a speed well 
above 60km/h. Saskatchewan’s Traffic 
Safety Act (s.204) requires motorists to slow their 
vehicles to 60km/h when passing an emergency vehicle 
with lights flashing. The vehicle was stopped and the 
driver, accused Bramley, produced a British Columbia 
photo driver's licence and a rental agreement for the 
vehicle in a female’s name that did not authorize an 
additional driver. The accused Bramley explained he 
couldn't afford to rent the vehicle so he had his wife 
put it on her credit card. He also told police that he 
and Schiller were going to visit friends in Regina. The 
accuseds appeared quite nervous to police. Bramley 
would make eye contact and then look away and had a 
nervous giggle while Schiller did not make any eye 
contact and looked “odd” with his long hair all tucked 
up under his ball cap, perhaps trying to conceal his 
identity. A CPIC check showed both accuseds had 
prior convictions for drug offences including 
possession for the purpose of trafficking.
The accuseds were detained in the back of a police car 
on suspicion of trafficking narcotics, advised of their 
rights to counsel, and given the police warning. 
Neither wanted to speak with a lawyer. A drug 
detector dog was called to the stop, circling the 
vehicle and sitting at its rear. This was a positive 
indication and the men were arrested for possessing 
narcotics. They were again advised of their rights to 
counsel and given the police warning. The trunk of the 
vehicle was opened and a large black suitcase, a 
knapsack, and a smaller duffle bag were located. In 
these bags police found drugs resulting in charges of 
unlawfully possessing cannabis resin and marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the officers 
testified they regularly worked together patrolling 
major highways in an effort to rigorously enforce 
traffic and highway driving laws and in doing so, 
attempted to closely watch for the movement of any 
contraband or any other illegal activity. One of the 
officers also said the accuseds’ nervous behaviour, 
criminal records, third party rental vehicle status 
from British Columbia, and his training and experience 
as a police officer that people haul and smuggle drugs 
using third party rental vehicles lead him to suspect 
that the men were in possession of a controlled 
substance, transporting it from British Columbia to 
Regina. He therefore decided to detain them to 
further the investigation. The accuseds argued their 
rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter had been 
breached. 
Detention
In this case, Judge Kovatch found the initial stop of 
the vehicle was lawful: 
[T]he officers had reasonable grounds to believe 
that an offence had been committed under The 
Traffic Safety Act of Saskatchewan in that the 
accused passed the police vehicle, with emergency 
lights engaged, at a speed greater than 60 km per 
hour. Under s. 209.1 of The Traffic Safety Act, the 
officers had the legal right to stop the accused's 
vehicle, and to require the driver, Mr. Bramley, to 
produce identifying information. However, … police 
powers allowed and justified under The Traffic 
Safety Act will be restricted in their use to 
investigation and enforcement of matters under 
that Act. In other words, and in terms of this case, 
the Crown could not assert a right to search this 
vehicle because the accused had been detained 
under the provisions of The Traffic Safety Act. It 
is clear that any investigative detention and search 
of this vehicle must stand or fall solely on the basis 
of the information that the police acquired after 
the stop of the vehicle and whether they had 
grounds for a detention or a search under the 
provisions of the Criminal Code and the common law. 
[reference omitted, para. 14]
However, the further detention related to the drug 
investigation beyond the initial reason for the stop  
could not be justified and amounted to an arbitrary 
detention. In order for an investigative detention to 
be lawful the police must have reasonable grounds to 
detain, which is a lower threshold than reasonable and 
probable grounds for lawful arrest. But an officer's 
hunch is not sufficient. Reasonable grounds to detain 
requires "a constellation of objectively discernable 
facts which give the detaining officer reasonable 
cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally 
implicated in the activity under investigation". In 
holding that the police officers had no reasonable 
grounds for the investigative detention, thus 
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rendering the accuseds’ detentions arbitrary and 
unlawful, Judge Kovatch stated.
[T]here was nothing… to give [police] a reasonable 
basis to conclude that any criminal offence had 
been committed or that these individuals were 
involved in any criminal activity. [T]he officers saw 
individuals who bore a number of similar 
characteristics, or bore a similar profile to the 
profile shown to the police officers in their training 
courses. In my view, however, it cannot be said that 
the identification of the similar characteristics or 
similar profile gives reasonable grounds to detain. 
The reason is simple. While all, or a large number, 
of criminals may exhibit certain characteristics, it 
cannot be said that all or even a significant number 
of individuals displaying such characteristics are 
criminals. For example, while a substantial number 
of drug couriers may use vehicles rented by third 
parties, I very much doubt that a significant 
percentage of individuals that may drive a rented 
vehicle, or a vehicle rented by a third party, are 
involved as drug couriers. The only additional factor 
identified by the officer was that both accused 
displayed some nervousness. In my view, some 
nervousness shown by individuals, when stopped by 
police, is normal. This factor is not sufficient to 
change my assessment that the officers did not 
have reasonable grounds to detain. [para. 19]
Search and Seizure 
Since there was no legitimate investigative detention 
but an arbitrary one, the search of the accused's 
vehicle and property pursuant to an unlawful or 
arbitrary detention was also unlawful. The search was 
not validly conducted as one incidental to the arrest 
because no arrest had been made until after a search 
had been conducted by the sniffer dog. Also, in light 
of the recent Supreme Court of Canada judgments on 
police sniffer dogs (in R. v. Kang-Brown and R. v. A.M.), 
the Crown failed in its argument that the sniffer dog 
was only employed as an investigative tool and its use 
did not amount to a search because it merely examined 
air space adjacent to the accused's car. Although the 
positive sit by the sniffer dog, which gave police 
reasonable grounds for arrest, did not require prior 
judicial authorization, it did require a "reasonable 
suspicion". Here, the reasonable suspicion test was not 
met. A reasonable suspicion is lesser than reasonable 
and probable grounds, but still has an objective 
component. “There must be objectively ascertainable 
facts upon which the Court can conclude that there 
was a reasonable suspicion,” said Judge Kovatch. He 
continued:
In this case as in Kang-Brown, the police officers 
identified a number of characteristics that were 
similar to the profile given to the police during their 
specialized training. Here, as in Kang-Brown, the 
police officers determined that the accused were 
very nervous. In both cases, there was little other 
than the profile similarities and nervousness on the 
part of the accused, to justify or ground the police 
actions. In short, in my view, this case is 
indistinguishable from the Kang-Brown decision, and 
I must determine that there was no reasonable 
basis for the search by the sniffer dog and as a 
result the search by the sniffer dog was conducted 
contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. Clearly the 
subsequent search of the vehicle and the suitcases 
contained in the trunk of the vehicle must be simply 
an extension of the initial search by the sniffer 
dog. As a result, the entirety of the search must be 
found to be unreasonable and contrary to s. 8 of the 
Charter. [para. 24]
The evidence was excluded under s.24(2).
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ACTING IN COURSE OF DUTIES 
A WIDE TERM
R. v. Jaw, 2008 NUCA 02
 
The accused had been living in common-
law when his spouse told him to leave her 
home. Instead, he tried to reconcile with 
her. As the situation began to 
deteriorate, the accused’s spouse called police and 
told the 911 operator that she wanted the accused 
out, but he refused to go and that she feared the 
situation may worsen and become physical. During this 
call, the accused retrieved his shotgun and racked it 
to demonstrate it was loaded. That caused a live round 
to eject, which the accused then placed back in the 
gun before returning it to the closet.
R.C.M.P. Cst. Jergen Seewald, in police uniform, 
attended the residence During the encounter the 
accused alleged the officer pushed him down into a 
chair and used pepper spray on him. At some point, the 
accused went to the closet, retrieved the shotgun, 
and the officer was fatally shot. The accused left the 
residence without checking on the wounded officer, 
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who was still alive and in 
obvious distress, but 
turned himself in the 
following day. 
At trial in Nunavut 
Supreme Court the accused 
submitted, in part, that the 
officer’s force was 
excessive, hence he was 
not in the course of his 
duties, or engaged in a lawful arrest, so resistance 
would not be unlawful. Thus, the killing would not be 
first degree murder of a peace officer on duty even 
though the accused knew Cst. Seewald was a peace 
officer. Crown, on the other hand, disputed the 
contention that Cst. Seewald used excessive force, 
such as to take him out of the course of his duty and 
argued that such a defence to first degree murder 
ought not be put to the jury. 
The trial judge concluded that excessive force, even 
if shown, could not remove the definitional element of 
acting in the course of a peace officer’s duty in a first 
degree murder offence. He ruled the jury should not 
be asked to decide whether the officer, in allegedly 
pushing the accused down into a chair and using pepper 
spray, had used force to such a degree as to find him 
no longer acting in the course of his duty. “As a matter 
of law, the unjustified use of force by a police officer, 
short of raising an issue of self-defence, or, indeed, 
an issue of provocation, does not affect the 
applicability of Section 231(4)(a) of the Criminal 
Code,” said the trial judge. “In plain terms, even if 
Constable Seewald committed an assault, he was still 
acting in the course of his duties, and Section 
231(4)(a) still applies.”
 
The accused was convicted by a jury of first degree 
murder in the shooting. He then challenged his 
conviction, again arguing, among other grounds, that 
the jury should have been instructed that killing the 
officer might be second degree murder if they found 
that Cst. Seewald used excessive force in dealing with 
the accused, on the basis that the officer was no 
longer acting in the course of his duty when the 
shooting occurred. In his view, the officer may have 
been acting in the course of his duties when 
responding to the 911 call, but when he stepped into 
the apartment without the accused’s permission, or 
when he used pepper spray, he had stepped beyond 
the scope of his authority and was no longer “acting in 
the course of his duties” when he was shot. 
Section 231(4)(a) of the Criminal Code makes the 
killing of a peace officer acting in the course of their 
duties first degree murder regardless of whether it 
was planned or deliberate. Acting in the course of 
duty, however, does not incorporate elements of 
“execution” of duty by applying a requirement of 
“lawful” to “course”.
The Nunavut Court of Appeal found the accused’s 
argument failed on the basis of the law. The meaning 
given to “course” of duties is temporal and a wide 
term. It not only includes activities covered by the 
narrower term "engaged in the execution of his duty", 
said the Court, citing R. v. Prevost, (1988) 42 C.C.C. 
(3d) 314, “but also includes ‘any activity which is 
related to the performance of a duty or to the ability 
of the officer to perform his duty. Thus, refueling the 
cruiser, having lunch, attending to one's toilet 
necessities, receiving medical attention, or similar 
activities during a tour of duty would all fall within 
this definition’.”
 
Here, the accused tried to narrow the definition of 
the “course” of duty to cover only that which an 
officer might lawfully do during his shift. But the test 
BY THE BOOK:
s.231(4) Criminal Code:
Irrespective of whether a murder is planned 
and deliberate on the part of any person, 
murder is first degree murder when the 
victim is
(a) a police officer, police constable, constable, sheriff, 
deputy sheriff, sheriff’s officer or other person 
employed for the preservation and maintenance of the 
public peace, acting in the course of his duties;
(b) a warden, deputy warden, instructor, keeper, jailer, 
guard or other officer or a permanent employee of a 
prison, acting in the course of his duties; or
(c) a person working in a prison with the permission of 
the prison authorities and acting in the course of his 
work therein.
Cst Jergen Seewald
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is not to look “at whether a specific authority of the 
officer was being lawfully executed at the time of his 
death, but whether the officer was an officer in the 
legal sense of acting in the course of his duties when 
murdered.” Justice Watson stated:
The venerable strict construction concept does not 
assist the [accused] here. On its face, the word 
“acting in the course” connotes temporal connection 
in a neutral sense. It is not in that sense ambiguous 
such as to attract a narrowing of that meaning. To 
add, as does the [accused], a requirement that the 
Crown prove beyond a reasonable doubt not merely 
that the officer was acting in the course of his duty 
but specifically executing a cognizable legal duty in 
a lawful manner, exceeds the wording of the Code. 
[references omitted, para. 64]
The Court also looked to the French language version 
of this Criminal Code provision to ascertain the 
common meaning in context:
 
In my view, the common meaning, in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense, of the words two 
linguistic versions of s.231(4)(a) of the Code read in 
their contexts is that the concept of “acting in the 
course” of duty is a temporal concept, referring to 
the officer being then on duty. Arguably, an officer 
might, even if “off-duty” to begin with, embark upon 
a course of conduct which also would mean he is 
“acting in the course” of his duty, but it is not 
necessary to discuss that point. Moreover, this case 
does not raise any issue of the [accused’s] mens rea 
in connection with the status of Cst. Seewald. 
Accordingly, that potential limiting effect on the 
extent of application of a temporal interpretation of 
s.231(4)(a) of the Code also need not be discussed.
 
Cst. Seewald arrived in the course of his duty here 
and, plainly, continued to pursue 
the purpose of his arrival as 
associated with that duty. He 
did not lose his temporal status 
of being “on duty” by allegedly 
exceeding the execution of a 
lawful authority. Cst. Seewald’s 
dying remarks may have 
reflected some doubt on his 
part as to how he handled the 
situation. That evidence was 
not meaningful in relation to 
what his status was as one 
cannot say what he was thinking 
about.
 
The scheme of this provision, reflecting the overall 
intent of Parliament, is to enhance the deterrent 
and denunciatory effect of punishment for murder 
of police officers on duty, regardless of what they 
are specifically doing. This policy must have regard 
to the police taking on (as here) the dangerous 
function of public protection and of keeping the 
peace in circumstances where the rest of us can 
retreat and not be second-guessed about specific 
policing techniques after the fact. [references 
omitted, paras. 68-70]
 
Further, it could be very complicated to try to “divide 
a mosaic of events with a view to reducing the quality 
of the murder committed for sentencing purposes.” 
For example, deciding whether a deceased officer 
violated some internal directive, who fired the first 
shots, or what the subjective opinion of a police 
officer was as to their relevant authority can be 
difficult:
 
In other words, discussions of legality of police 
action could involve objective and subjective 
inferences about both conduct and state of mind. 
Apart from the complexity of such an investigation 
by the jury, it would be difficult to differentiate 
such an exercise from amounting to a post-facto 
police fault inquiry quite distinct from determining 
any relevant legal defence for the defendant. … If 
[defences such as self-defence or provocation] 
arise, their legal effect would be unimpaired by a 
temporal definition to s. 231(4)(a) of the Code. If 
they do not arise, there would be no clear purpose 
to contradicting the intent of Parliament to treat 
the murder of police officers differently for 
sentencing purposes. … [para. 72] 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
"The scheme of this provision ... is to 
enhance the deterrent and denunciatory 
effect of punishment for murder of police 
officers on duty, regardless of what they 
are specifically doing. This policy must 
have regard to the police taking on ... 
the dangerous function of public 
protection and of keeping the peace in 
circumstances where the rest of us can 
retreat and not be second-guessed 
about specific policing techniques after 
the fact.”
July 31-August 9, 2009
Vancouver, BC
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BY THE BOOK:
New s. 249 Motor Vehicle Act:
Part 8 — Police Accident Reports
Accident reports by police officer
(1) If
(a) a vehicle driven or operated on a highway directly or 
indirectly causes death or injury to a person or 
damage to property causing aggregate damage 
apparently exceeding a prescribed amount, or
(b) an accident involving the presence or operation of a 
cycle on a highway or a sidewalk directly or indirectly 
causes death or injury to a person or damage to 
property causing aggregate damage apparently 
exceeding a prescribed amount,
a police officer who attends the accident must complete a 
written report of the accident in the form established by the 
Insurance Corporation of British Columbia and forward it to 
the corporation within 10 days of the accident.
(2) A person involved in an accident referred to in 
subsection (1)(a), or that person's authorized 
representative, is entitled to obtain on request the names 
of any drivers involved, the licence number, the name of 
the registered owner of any motor vehicle involved and the 
name of any witness.
BC CHANGES ACCIDENT 
REPORTING LEGISLATION
In R. v. Powers, 2006 BCCA 454, 
British Columbia’s Court of Appeal 
ruled that an accused’s admission to 
a police officer given under 
compulsion of s. 67 of BC’s Motor Vehicle Act (MVA)  
that he was the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an 
accident breached his s.7 Charter right against self-
incrimination and was inadmissible. Without the 
admission the officer was unable to establish a 
reasonable suspicion for an approved screening device 
demand under s.254(2) of the Criminal Code, which the 
accused had failed and was ultimately relied upon for 
a formal breathalyzer demand under s.254(3), and 
which showed a blood-alcohol concentration over 
80mg%. Since the Crown was unable to establish that 
the officer had reasonable grounds to make the 
breathalyzer demand, the accused’s acquittal on an 
over 80mg% charge was upheld. 
Section 67 was repealed and replaced by s.67.1. The 
new provision removes reference to reporting the 
accident to a police officer (see underlined text in 
table below). As well, s.68(1)(c) was amended by 
striking out "to a peace officer or", thereby removing 
the obligation on drivers to furnish information to a 
peace officer when requested. Similar amendments 
were made to the reporting and furnishing of 
information involving a bicycle accident under s.183 of 
the MVA.
Accident Reports and Duty on Driver
Old s.67(1) If a vehicle driven or operated on a highway, 
either directly or indirectly, causes death or injury to a person or 
damage to property causing aggregate damage apparently 
exceeding the amount set out in subsection (2), the person 
driving or in charge of the vehicle must
(a) report the accident to a police officer or to a person 
designated by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia to 
receive those reports, and
(b) furnish the information respecting the accident required by the 
police officer or designated person.
New s.67.1(1) If a vehicle driven or operated on a highway 
directly or indirectly causes death or injury to a person or damage 
to property causing aggregate damage apparently exceeding a 
prescribed amount, the driver of the vehicle must within the 
prescribed period of time after the accident report the accident, 
in the form established by the superintendent, to the person or 
public body identified in the regulations for this purpose.
Old s.68 (1) (c) The driver or operator or any other person in 
charge of a vehicle that is, directly or indirectly, involved in an 
accident on a highway must do all of the following ... (c) produce 
in writing to any other driver involved in the accident and to 
anyone sustaining loss or injury, and, on request, to a peace officer 
or to a witness (i)  his or her name and address ... or such of that 
information as is requested.
New s.68 (1) (c) The driver or operator or any other person 
in charge of a vehicle that is, directly or indirectly, involved in an 
accident on a highway must do all of the following ... (c) produce 
in writing to any other driver involved in the accident and to 
anyone sustaining loss or injury, and, on request, to a witness (i)  
his or her name and address ... or such of that information as is 
requested.
www.10-8.ca
27
Volume 8 Issue 4
July/August 2008
CITIZEN’S ‘INVESTIGATIVE 
DETENTION’ NOT SUBJECT TO 
CHARTER SCRUTINY
R. v. Asp, 2008 BCSC 794
A private security guard became 
suspicious after the accused left a hotel 
in the middle of the night with his 
luggage and some bags through an 
emergency exit without informing the front desk. The 
guard called 911 but the operator told him that 
following another vehicle was not condoned and not to 
get out of his vehicle. The guard began to scream and 
said “Hey, guys, please”, referred to his location, and 
then the phone went dead. Police attended the scene 
and observed the guard and the accused struggling 
with each other. The guard was attempting to detain 
the accused. During the altercation, the accused’s 
vehicle had rolled forward and struck a pole, 
dislodging the lid of a box in the back seat. When 
police looked into the vehicle they saw plastic bags of 
marijuana in the box and a can of bear spray on the 
ground beside the guard’s vehicle, which the police 
seized.  The police arrested the accused and his 
female companion for possessing a controlled 
substance. His vehicle was towed to the police station 
where it was searched without a warrant and 
marijuana, in 54 zip-lock bags, weighing 13.59 kg., was 
seized. The accused was charged with possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) 
of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme Court 
the accused sought to have the marihuana seized from 
his vehicle excluded as evidence under s.24(2) alleging 
his Charter  rights under ss. 7, 8, and 9 were 
breached. The accused argued the Charter applied to 
the actions of the security guard making a citizen’s 
arrest because he was government within the meaning 
of s.32. And moreover, the police could have obtained 
a search warrant but chose not to. Since the accused’s 
rights were breached, the marihuana should have been 
ruled inadmissible. The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended the facts did not establish that there was 
a citizen’s arrest and, even if there was one, the 
Charter did not apply to a citizen’s arrest because the 
security guard was not performing a government 
function. 
Government Test
In this case, Justice Arnold-Bailey found the Charter 
did not apply to the actions of the security guard. 
First, the guard was not making a citizen’s arrest 
under s.494 of the Criminal Code. The mere fact the 
guard touched the accused and used some force with 
a view to his detention was not enough to establish the 
start of a citizen’s arrest. An arrest is a continuing 
act and the evidence was unclear about whether the 
guard was going to briefly detain the accused and let 
him go if he found nothing incriminating, or whether 
he planned to deliver him to the police. And just 
because force is used, whether by a security guard or 
a police officer, does not necessarily elevate a 
detention to an arrest. Since this was not a citizen’s 
arrest there was no reason to determine whether it 
could be construed as state action for Charter 
purposes, which, in the court’s view, remained an open 
question. 
Second, even if Charter protection applied to citizen’s 
arrests, it does not extend to an investigative 
detention by a private person. “If the security guard’s 
actions in relation to the [accused] were to amount to 
an investigative detention, as opposed to a citizen’s 
arrest, the Charter does not apply,” said Justice 
Arnold-Bailey. “To the extent the activities of the 
security guard constituted an investigative detention 
the protection of the Charter is…not available to 
[him].”
Since the actions of the guard were not subject to 
Charter scrutiny he did not breach the accused’s 
rights and therefore there was not a sufficient nexus 
between the alleged violations and the police seeing 
and seizing the marijuana, rendering s.24(2) applicable.
Police Action
A search or seizure under s.8 of the Charter will be 
reasonable if it is authorized by law (statute or 
common law), the law itself is reasonable, and it is 
carried out in a reasonable manner.  When a search or 
seizure is undertaken without a warrant it is prima 
facie unreasonable and the Crown bears the burden of 
showing it was, on the balance of probabilities, 
reasonable.
Here the evidence was in plain view and the police 
were entitled to seize it. Justice Arnold-Bailey noted 
the following points:
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1. The officers had lawful 
justification for their presence at 
the roadside.   They were 
responding to a 9-1-1 call from the 
security guard who requested 
their assistance and then seemed 
to be in obvious difficulties; 
2. The officers discovered the 
marijuana in [the accused’s] 
vehicle inadvertently while 
performing their lawful police 
duty; i.e. investigating the physical altercation 
between the security guard and the [accused]; 
3. A significant quantity of marijuana was clearly in 
plain view, as it was exposed when the box in the 
back seat tipped and the lid fell off during the 
collision of [the accused’s] vehicle with the pole.  
Thus, the marijuana could be seen in the box, tipped 
on its side, through the windows of the vehicle. 
[para. 50]
And even if plain view did not 
justify the seizure a search 
incidental to arrest did. The police 
were entitled to search for and 
seize the marijuana from the 
vehicle after the accused’s arrest 
for unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance even though 
(1) they believed they could have 
obtained a search warrant, (2) no 
exigent circumstances existed such 
that evidence in the vehicle might 
have been lost or destroyed had they waited and 
applied for a warrant, and (3) there was no risk 
evidence would have been removed from the vehicle 
while awaiting a warrant:
For a search to be valid under the common law power 
of search incidental to arrest: (1) the arrest must 
be lawful; (2) the search must have been conducted 
as an “incident” to the lawful arrest; and (3) the 
manner in which the search was carried out must be 
reasonable.  
For a search to be truly incidental to arrest, the 
police must be attempting to achieve some valid 
purpose connected to the arrest.  The three main 
purposes of search incident to arrest are ensuring 
the safety of the police and the public, the 
protection of evidence from destruction at the 
hands of the arrestee or others, and the discovery 
of evidence that can be used at the arrestee’s trial.  
The power of search incidental to arrest extends to 
authorize the search of a motor vehicle driven by an 
arrested person. The right to 
search a car incidental to arrest 
and the scope of that search 
will depend a number of factors, 
including the location of the 
motor vehicle in relation to the 
place of arrest. Further, delay 
and distance from the place of 
arrest do not preclude a search 
from being incidental to arrest. 
In this case, the officers, 
having seen the marijuana in plain view, had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
accused. Further … the police searched the 
accused’s vehicle, which they found with the 
accused at the place of arrest, as part of a drug 
investigation, which is a valid purpose connected to 
the accused’s arrest for possession of a controlled 
substance.   Finally, there is no 
suggestion that search was carried 
out in an unreasonable manner. 
[references omitted, paras. 52-55]
The seizure of the marijuana seen 
by the police in plain view, the 
subsequent search of the vehicle, 
and the further seizure of 
marijuana as a search incidental to 
arrest were proper and did not 
breach the accused’s s.8 Charter 
rights. The marihuana was 
therefore admissible. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
s.8 BREACHED, BUT EVIDENCE 
ADMITTED ANYWAY
R. v. Khan, 2008 ONCA 496
Police obtained a telewarrant to search 
the accused’s home at night. At trial in 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
the judge found a s.8 Charter breach 
but admitted the evidence under s.24(2). The firearm, 
ammunition, body armour and drugs found during the 
search resulted in the accused’s conviction on a 
number of firearms and drug-related offences.  He 
then appealed his convictions to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred by failing to 
exclude the evidence discovered during the search. In 
the accused’s view, the violation was serious and the 
reputation of the administration of justice mandated 
the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2). But in a 
“For a search to be valid under the 
common law power of search 
incidental to arrest: (1) the arrest 
must be lawful; (2) the search must 
have been conducted as an 
“incident” to the lawful arrest; and (3) 
the manner in which the search was 
carried out must be reasonable.” 
“The power of search incidental 
to arrest extends to authorize 
the search of a motor vehicle 
driven by an arrested person. 
The right to search a car 
incidental to arrest and the 
scope of that search will depend 
a number of factors, including 
the location of the motor vehicle 
in relation to the place of arrest.”
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unanimous endorsement, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial judge’s ruling.
 
The evidence was real, non-conscriptive evidence and 
therefore the admission of it would not render the 
trial unfair. Nor was the Charter violation serious. The 
breach was not wilful or flagrant, nor did the police 
act in bad faith or in a deliberate disregard of the 
accused’s rights.  And the breach did not reflect 
institutional indifference to individual rights. Rather, 
the breach was “close to the line”, inadvertent and 
unintentional.  Given “the totality of the information 
provided to him, the justice issuing the warrant would 
not have been misled as to the credibility or reliability 
of the informant on whose tip the police relied in 
obtaining the warrant.” 
And even though the accused had a strong privacy 
interest in the search of his home at night, “the 
circumstances were urgent and the mode and timing of 
the entry to the [accused’s] home were designed to 
ensure the safety of the police, the occupants of the 
home and the public”:
Information came to the attention of the police that 
the [accused] was in illegal possession of a firearm, 
ammunition and body armour, giving rise to what was 
a potentially serious risk of danger to the public.  
Given the genuine safety concerns that arose here 
for the police and the public, we agree with the trial 
judge that urgency existed and the time and method 
of entry to the appellant’s home were justified. 
[para. 10]
And finally, in agreeing with the trial judge that the 
evidence should be admitted, the Appeal Court stated:
The crimes charged were very serious and the 
impugned evidence was essential to the Crown’s 
case.  The non-conscriptive evidence at issue 
involved both a gun and drugs.  The Charter breach 
was not serious and there is no suggestion that an 
unfair trial will result from the admission of the 
evidence.   Having regard to all these factors, the 
exclusion of this evidence at the [accused’s] trial 
would exact a great toll on the long-term integrity 
of the justice system.   We agree with the trial 
judge that the effect of the exclusion of the 
evidence in this case would be more detrimental to 
the reputation of the administration of justice than 
would the effect of its admission. [para. 12]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DID YOU KNOW...that Canada’s motor vehicle 
theft rate was 443 per 100,000 population in 2007, 
down -8.8% from 2006. BC’s rate was 619 while the 
Abbotsford Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) was 
1,001, the Vancouver CMA 630, and the Victoria CMA 
355. Manitoba had the highest motor vehicle theft 
rate at 1,236 with Winnipeg topping out the CMA rates 
at 1,714 stolen vehicles per 100,000. Source: Statistics Canada, 
2008, Crime Statistics in Canada, 2007, Catalogue No:85-002-X
BC’s 25 Top Stolen Vehicles (2007)
Rank Make Model
1 Honda Civic
2 Chrysler (Dodge/Plymouth) Caravan/Voyager
3 Honda Accord
4 Ford F-Series (F150,F250,F350)
5 Jeep Cherokee
6 Chrysler (Dodge/Plymouth) Neon
7 Nissan Pathfinder
8 Toyota Camry
9 Acura Integra
10 Dodge Ram
11 Mazda B2200/B2600 Pick-up
12 Dodge Dakota
13 Toyota 4 Runner
14 Chrysler Intrepid
15 GMC Sierra
16 Dodge Durango
17 Nissan 240
18 Ford Explorer
19 Dodge Spirit
20 Volkswagen Golf
21 GMC G3500
22 Plymouth Acclaim
23 Chevrolet Cavalier
24 Honda Prelude
25 Toyota Corolla
Source: www.icbc.com
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BC
10,433 AB
9,237
SK
13,225
MB
10,829 QC
5,317
ON
5,228
NF
6,346
PEI
5,982
NS
7,456NB
5,502
YT
21,317 NU
29,917NWT
43,762
Canada’s National  Crime Rate  
6,984 offences per 100,000
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, 
“Crime Statistics in Canada, 2007”, 
Catalogue No:85-002-XE
Criminal Code Crime Rates 
for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) 
2007 - Top 15
CMA Crime Rate
Regina SK 11,827
Saskatoon SK 11,560
Abbotsford BC 10,341
Winnipeg MB 9,644
Edmonton AB 9,572
Victoria BC 9,335
Vancouver BC 9,136
Thunder Bay ON 8,819
Saint John NB 8,292
Halifax NS 7,954
Saint John’s NF 7,325
London ON 7,296
Calgary ABF 6,202
Windsor ON 6,138
Kingston ON 5,970
Provincial & Territorial Crime Rates 
per 100,000 population.
-8.4%
-7.2%
-3.5%
-3.8%
-8.2%
-8.6%
-10.1%
-5.3%
-12.1%
-7.7%
+6.2%
+3.4% +3.2%
2007 CANADIAN CRIME STATISTICS
Statistics Canada recently released its report 
entitled “Crime Statistics in Canada, 2007”. 
Highlights include:
• National crime rate dropped by -7.4%. Violent crime was down -2.5%, 
property crime was down -7.7% and other Criminal Code incidents 
were down -8.6%.
• National homicide rate dropped by -3.0%.
• B.C.’s homicide rate dropped by -19.6%.
• Youth crime rate decreased -1.5%. Youth homicide rate dropped by 
-10.5%. 
• Total drug offences increased by +2%. Marihuana offences 
increased by +4%, while cocaine offences rose by +0.9% and other 
drug offences, which includes crystal meth and heroin, rose by +6.5%.
• B.C. had the highest provincial drug offence rate at 654 per 
100,000. This was more than twice the next highest rate 
(Saskatchewan at 286) and almost four times PEI’s and  
Newfoundland’s rate (142 and 169 respectively).
• Impaired operation rate (including over 80mg% and refusal) 
increased by +3.4% nationwide. The Yukon had the greatest increase 
at +49.4% followed by Newfoundland at +25.3%. Saskatchewan had 
the highest provincial impaired rate at 545 per 100,000, more than 
three times Ontario’s rate.
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Property Crime
Nationally, property crime dropped -7.7%. Every area 
saw a decrease in property crime with the Yukon 
(-14.5%), Nova Scotia (-12.5), and PEI (-12.0) seeing 
the largest drops. 
Motor Vehicle Theft
Motor vehicle theft was down -8.8% nationwide, with 
the greatest decreases in Nova Scotia and the North 
West Territories (-23.3%). All other regions saw a 
decrease with the exception of PEI and Nunavut 
(+6.6% and +5.3% respectively). 
Break and Enter
Break and enters also saw a decrease, down -9.0%. 
The Yukon had the largest decrease (-25.3%) followed 
by New Brunswick (-15.0%), Ontario (-11.0%), and the 
Northwest Territories (-10.4%). 
Violent Crime
Violent crime in Canada was down -2.5%. This included 
homicide (-3.0%), attempted murder (-5.1%), robbery 
(-4.7%), sexual assault (-4.5%), and assault (-2.5%). 
Nunavut saw the greatest increase in homicide 
(+242%) followed by Manitoba (+57.9%) and New 
Brunswick (+14.2%). 
Motor Vehicle Theft (MVT) Rates 
for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) 
2007 - Top 5
CMA MVT Rate per 100,000
Winnipeg MB 1,714
Abbotsford BC 1,001
Edmonton AB 832
Regina SK 735
Calgary AB 639
Property Crime Rates 
for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) 
2007 - Top 5
CMA Crime Rate per 100,000
Abbotsford BC 5,868
Regina SK 5,703
Edmonton AB 5,166
Vancouver BC 5,100
Winnipeg MB 5,090
Break & Enter (B&E) Rates 
for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) 
2007 - Top 5
CMA B & E Rate per 100,000
Regina SK 1,618
Abbotsford BC 1,263
St John’s NF 1,028
Winnipeg MB 1,022
Vancouver BC 995
Homicide Rates 
for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) 
2007 - Top 5
CMA Homicide Rate per 100,000
Saskatoon SK 3.6
Winnipeg MB 3.6
Edmonton AB 3.3
Calgary AB 3.1
Trois-Rivieres QU 2.7
Note-able Quote
"Your life is the sum result of all the choices you 
make, both consciously and unconsciously. If you can 
control the process of choosing, you can take control 
of all aspects of your life. You can find the freedom 
that comes from being in charge of yourself." - 
Robert F. Bennett
www.10-8.ca
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‘HARD TAKE DOWN’ DID NOT 
TURN DETENTION INTO ARREST
R. v. Cunanan, 
2008 File NO.: 147/07 OntSCJ
As a result of information provided by a 
credible and confidential informant 
police began an investigation into two 
stolen automobiles. Police also received 
information that the accused,  a suspect, always had 
guns in his car and on his person.  A decision was made 
to attend in the area of the accused’s residence and, 
if he entered his vehicle, stop him and 
investigate. Officers understood that if the accused 
was arrested, he could be searched, but if he was 
stopped and investigated he could only be patted 
down.  
The accused was observed exit his building and walk 
towards his car, enter it, start it, and roll down the 
windows. An instruction to “take down” his vehicle was 
given. Police did not want the accused to leave the 
parking lot because the area was densely populated, 
there were potentially many people on the streets, 
and to prevent any possibility of a pursuit. As well, if 
there were guns in the accused’s vehicle and shots 
were fired, the apartment building would provide a 
back stop for bullets. The parking lot was the safest 
area to stop the accused.
An officer stopped her vehicle  about 4 or 5 feet from 
the nose of the accused’s vehicle as it was backing out 
of a parking spot and readying to proceed out of the 
lot.  The officer drew her firearm, ran to the accused 
in the driver’s seat and yelled, “Police, don’t move, let 
me see your hands.” The accused raised his hands then 
put them down and placed them on his lap.  The officer 
told the accused to turn the vehicle off, but he did 
not move, so she took him from the vehicle and put him 
face down on the ground.   The accused was patted 
down, but no weapons or drugs were found on him.
The accused’s car began to roll and 
struck the police vehicle. An officer 
saw the vehicle rolling forward, went 
to the driver’s side, opened the door, 
reached in, put it in park, and then 
turned the motor off.  In doing so, he 
saw a plastic package on the floor of 
the vehicle directly in front of the 
driver’s seat believed to contain 
cocaine. The package was seized and the accused was 
arrested for possessing cocaine, cautioned and given 
his rights to counsel. The vehicle was then searched 
after the arrest. Inside a driver’s side compartment 
in the trunk two 20 gauge shotgun shells wrapped in a 
piece of T-shirt were found. A search warrant to the 
accused’s apartment was subsequently obtained and a 
revolver, shotgun, ammunition, more than 750 grams 
of powdered cocaine, nine grams of crack cocaine, 22 
grams of oxycodone, and 150 grams of 
methamphetamine were discovered. The accused was 
subsequently charged with 18 weapons and drug 
offences.
During the first phase of a Charter application in the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice where the accused 
sought to have all the evidence excluded under s.24(2) 
of the Charter, Justice McWatt had to determine 
whether the accused was detained for investigative 
purposes or arrested. Officers testified they did not 
have reasonable grounds upon which to arrest the 
accused at the time the take down was ordered.  
Rather, the accused was to be stopped and 
investigated and if, after investigation, nothing was 
found which could give them grounds to arrest, the 
accused was to be released. The accused, however, 
argued he was under arrest from the beginning of the 
stop and that there were no grounds for that arrest, 
thus it was unlawful.  In his view, when his vehicle was 
boxed-in and he was taken out of it at gun point, even 
before any cocaine was located, the officers were 
conducting an arrest because they believed he was in 
possession of a firearm and drugs. Since the arrest 
was unlawful (lacking reasonable grounds), he 
contended the search and seizure from his vehicle was 
unreasonable as was the search and seizure from his 
residence. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
accused was not under arrest but had only been 
detained for investigative purposes, which the police 
were entitled to do. Drawing a firearm, extracting the 
accused from his car, and placing 
him on the ground were justifiable 
for officer and public safety and, 
in the Crown’s opinion, did not turn 
the stop into an arrest. The 
officers did not arrest him until 
they saw, in plain view, the cocaine 
in his car.
“... [the officer’s] forceful take 
down with the firearm in a low 
ready position was measured 
and reasonable. That feature of 
this stop did not turn the 
intended detention into a de 
facto arrest.” 
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Detention or Arrest?
In this case Justice McWatt found the encounter 
between the accused and the police was not an arrest, 
but was an investigative detention. But for the 
drawing of a firearm and putting the accused on the 
ground, she found every aspect of the stop matched 
the hallmarks of an investigative detention.
 
• The detention for investigative purposes was 
justified. There was a clear nexus between the 
accused and recent and ongoing offences of car 
theft and the possession and sale of drugs, and 
the possession of firearms based on the 
information from the police informant;
• The take down was brief (about four minutes) and 
the situation unfolded quickly from the initial stop 
to seeing the cocaine in the vehicle.  Police entry 
into the accused’s car was an instinctive and 
necessary response to its rolling forward and 
hitting the police vehicle;
• There was no plan prior to the stop and finding the 
cocaine to transport the accused back to the 
police station;
• Police wanted to stop and investigate the accused 
and had no grounds to arrest him.  If nothing came 
of the investigation, he was to be released;
• No words were used during the takedown which 
could be interpreted as part of an arrest until 
after the cocaine was seized.
As for the hard take down, it was reasonable. “In light 
of [the accused’s] suspected prior activities – 
especially as related to owning and using a firearm as 
set out in the occurrence report and 208 contact 
sheets, and based on the confidential informants’ 
information that [the accused] had a gun in his car the 
day before he was stopped and he was ready to use it, 
the manner in which he was stopped, although 
dramatic, and significantly interfering with his 
liberty, was necessary in the circumstances,” said 
Justice McWatt. She noted that police officers make 
split-second decisions every day, can find themselves 
in dangerous and potentially volatile situations, and 
have little time to reflect. Therefore they should be 
given a good deal of leeway and second guessing should 
be avoided:
When [the officer] told [the accused] to put his 
hands up, he did so and then put them into his lap.  
When [the officer] told [the accused] to turn off 
his vehicle, he did not.  Believing what she did about 
[the accused’s] proclivity to possess and use a gun, 
and their [sic] being no evidence to contradict her 
apprehension, her forceful take down with the 
firearm in a low ready position was measured and 
reasonable.  That feature of this stop did not turn 
the intended detention into a de facto arrest. [para. 
48]
The stop was a detention for investigative purposes 
and not an arrest.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (b) False—see R. v. Bradley (at p. 30 of this 
publication). 
2. (a) True—see R. v. Weintz (at p. 8 of this 
publication). 
3. (a) British Columbia—see Supreme Court Hearings 
Down (at p. 4 of this publication).
4. (a) True—see R. v. Willier (at p. 10 of this 
publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. Meganhy (at p. 6 of this 
publication). 
6. (a) impaired driving—see R. v. Weintz (at p. 8 of 
this publication). 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Second Guessing Police Discretion
“It is my view that Courts ought to exercise 
considerable caution when they, on the 
basis of hindsight, examine the exercise of 
discretions of police officers as to 
procedures to be implemented for 
investigations or methods of conducting incidental searches. 
We ask police to exercise these discretions in difficult, often 
dangerous and urgent circumstances. Courts must give the 
police sufficient latitude and grounds to conduct these 
investigations in safety for their own protection. Courts should 
be hesitant about second guessing the exercise of these 
discretions unless they are exercised clearly in an 
unreasonable manner.” - Alberta Provincial Court Judge Sully, 
R. v. Graham, 1999 ABPC 138 at para. 19. 
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PASSENGER IN VEHICLE NOT 
NECESSARILY DETAINED DURING 
TRAFFIC STOP
R. v. Bradley, 2008 NSCA 57
 
A police officer spotted a vehicle with its 
rear end very low, followed it, and ran the 
plate, learning the registered owner of 
the vehicle had a suspended license. The 
officer decided to stop the vehicle for two reasons: 
(1) the low rear end suggested a possible mechanical 
problem and (2) to check and see if the suspended 
owner was driving. He pulled the vehicle over and there 
were four occupants. Another officer attended as 
back up and stood on the passenger side of the vehicle 
to keep an eye on the occupants while the other 
officer dealt with the driver.
 
The officer received license, insurance and 
registration from the driver, who was not the 
registered owner. The owner, however, was in the 
front passenger seat. Both were cooperative with 
police. The officer explained the reason for the stop, 
determined the vehicle had a valid safety inspection, 
and took no further steps to examine the mechanical 
state of the vehicle. The accused, seated in the rear 
seat, asked the officer why they were being stopped 
and what the problem was. The officer felt that the 
accused’s tone indicated some belligerence and 
hostility and noted he had somewhat glassy eyes and 
his speech appeared to be somewhat slurred, 
consistent with consumption of alcohol. The officer 
could also smell alcohol coming from the car, but the 
driver was sober. 
 
The officer asked the accused his name, as well as the 
fourth person in the vehicle. The accused said he had 
done nothing and asked why he should have to give his 
name. The officer replied by stating if he hadn’t done 
anything wrong, why wouldn’t he give his name? The 
accused then reluctantly provided his name. He was 
run on CPIC and it was determined he was breaching a 
recognizance that prohibited him from possessing, 
consuming, or using alcohol. He was arrested, read his 
rights, and charged accordingly. 
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court, the trial judge 
found the driver was initially the only target of the 
stop, which was to investigate possible motor vehicle 
infractions. The officer had little interest, if any, in 
the passengers and the reason for the traffic stop 
had nothing to do with them. Nor did he have any 
reason to suspect that any offence had been 
committed by any of the vehicle’s occupants. The 
judge concluded the police were not taking advantage 
of a traffic stop to question its occupants in relation 
to other criminal activity. Rather, contact between 
the accused and the officer was initiated by the 
accused. The accused was never told he was compelled 
to provide his name or that he could not leave the car 
or otherwise had his movements controlled. The 
accused was convicted of breaching a recognizance..
 
The accused’s appeal to the Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court was unsuccessful. The appeal judge ruled that 
the stop was made for the purpose of investigating 
traffic offences and the officer did not concern 
himself with the accused until the accused initiated 
the conversation, in a hostile tone of voice. That led to 
the police officer asking for a name, primarily to run 
on CPIC for a status check as well as for assessing 
officer safety (which was accepted as a reasonable 
basis for asking the accused his name in the 
circumstances). As well, the accused indicated some 
awareness that he did not need to give his name by the 
way he responded to the officer’s request. The appeal 
judge found the accused was not in detention just 
because he was a passenger in a vehicle lawfully 
stopped by police. This was not a case where the 
traffic stop was made to investigate criminal activity.  
Rather, the stop was initially made to investigate two 
possible motor vehicle infractions. The appeal judge 
stated:
 
I do not accept the blanket proposition that once 
the driver of a motor vehicle is detained under a 
lawful traffic stop, all of its passengers are likewise 
detained automatically within the meaning of the 
Charter. In the case of the driver, the detention is 
made in the context of the police officer carrying 
out his statutory duties and powers under the 
Motor Vehicle Act. It is the driver who is being 
investigated. The presence of a passenger, on the 
other hand, is simply incidental or happenstance in 
situations where a traffic stop is made solely for 
purposes of investigating possible Motor Vehicle 
Act infractions. 
 
Since there was no detention the accused’s s.9 or 10 
rights were not engaged. 
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The accused then appealed to   the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal again 
arguing his s.9 and 10 rights had 
been violated. He submitted that he 
was detained when asked for his 
name, the detention was arbitrary 
(contrary to s.9), and that the police 
failed to advise him of his right to 
counsel (contrary to s.10(b)).  In his view, the evidence 
of his name and the information received by the police 
officer on CPIC should be excluded under s.24(2).
Justice Roscoe, authoring the unanimous judgment, 
concluded the trial judge had not erred in his analysis 
in holding there was no detention. He agreed that “it 
is not an absolute rule that every passenger in a motor 
vehicle is automatically detained as soon as the vehicle 
is pulled over by police.” Here, the accused was not 
under any physical or psychological restraint as a form 
of detention and no direction or demand was given to 
him by the police officer. 
Although the reasons the police have for stopping a 
vehicle are generally more relevant to the issue of 
whether a detention was arbitrary than to the 
question of whether there was a detention, Justice 
Roscoe was not persuaded, as submitted by the 
accused, “that it is necessarily an error of law in the 
case of the passenger, to consider the reasons for and 
the manner in which the stop is handled, as part of the 
overall circumstances that must be weighed when 
deciding whether there is a psychological or physical 
restraint.” Determining whether a detention occurs 
involves a fact-specific and context-sensitive inquiry 
and the reasons for stopping a citizen for questioning 
is one of the relevant factors. Justice Roscoe 
concluded:
In this case the trial judge heard the testimony of 
the police officer and the [accused] and concluded 
that on the facts of this case there had been no 
direction or demand given by the police officer and 
that the [accused] was not under any significant 
physical or psychological restraint and therefore 
not detained when he was asked to state his name. 
The summary conviction appeal court judge was not 
persuaded that the trial judge committed palpable 
or overriding error in reaching that conclusion. My 
review of the record satisfies me that [the appeal 
judge’s] decision discloses no error of law.
 
Since there was no detention it is unnecessary to 
address the question of whether there was an 
arbitrary detention, or a violation of the [accused’s] 
rights pursuant to ss. 9 and 10 of the 
Charter. Therefore there is no need 
to discuss the s. 24(2) issue. [paras. 
20-21]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DID YOU KNOW...
...that...
• the average elapsed time from an 
accused’s first court appearance 
to their last was 237 days (just 
under eight months) in 2006/
2007. This is up almost a month 
longer than 2005/2006, which was 
211 days. Quebec had the longest 
average elapsed time at 294 days 
while Prince Edward Island had the 
shortest at 62 days.
• probation was the most frequently imposed 
sanction (43% of guilty cases), followed by 
imprisonment (34%), and a fine (30%). 
• in  cases where probation was imposed, 51% were 
for a term between >6-12 months, 31% >12-24 
months, 10% >3-6 months, 5% >24 months, and 4% 
3 months or less. 
• the average length of a prison sentence imposed  
was 124 days. Prince Edward Island had the 
highest rate of incarceration where 55% of guilty 
persons were incarcerated, followed by the Yukon 
(42%), Northwest Territories (40%), British 
Columbia (39%), Alberta (38%), Newfoundland 
(35%), Manitoba (35%), Quebec (34%), Nunavut 
(34%), Ontario (33%), Saskatchewan (26%), New 
Brunswick (25%), and Nova Scotia (25%). 
• in cases where incarceration was imposed, 56% 
were for 1 month or less, 20% >1-3 months, 10% 
>3-6 months, 6% >6-12 months, 5% 2 years or 
more, and 3% >1 year - <2 years.
• the average fine amount imposed  was $759.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Adult Criminal Court Statistics, 
2006/2007, Catalogue no. 85-002-X available at www.statcan.ca
Note-able Quote
“I sometimes wish that people would put a little more 
emphasis upon the observance of the law than they do 
upon its enforcement.” - Calvin Coolidge
“[I]t is not an absolute rule that 
every passenger in a motor 
vehicle is automatically 
detained as soon as the 
vehicle is pulled over by 
police.”
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